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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment dismissing all causes of action in the

Third Party Complaint brought by Appellants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, D. Richard Linford and
Lindsey Linford ("the Linfords") against Respondent/Third-Party Defendant, State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company ("State Farm Fire").1 The dispute between the parties arises out of a fire
which caused property damage to portions ofthe Linfords' house. No one else's property was
damaged and no one suffered bodily injury as a result of the fire. Because only the Linfords'
property was damaged, the relevant coverage in the homeowners policy issued by State Farm Fire
was Section I, Coverage A - Dwelling ("Coverage A"),z (R., pp. 95-131; See also relevant
portions of the Policy attached as Ex. A to the Addendum hereto.) This is a first party coverage?
Because there was no property damage or bodily injuries to anyone other than the Linfords,

IThe Linfords also purport to appeal from the denial of their Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 1; 9.) It is well established Idaho law that the denial
of summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,
376,973 P.2d 142, 146 (1999). As will be discussed throughout this Brief, the attempted appeal
from a denial of summary judgment is but one in a series of frivolous, unsupportable arguments
made by the Linfords.
2There is no dispute between the parties regarding or appeal from payment for personal
property losses or additional living expenses also triggered by the fire loss. (R., p. 187.)
3First party coverage regards a claim by an insured under his or her own insurance policy
for bodily injury or property damage suffered by the insured. First party coverage provides
indemnity but not a defense.
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Section II, Coverage L - Personal Liability ("Coverage L") does not apply. This is a third party
coverage4
Per the Linfords' homeowners policy, ifthere is a dispute as to the amount of the loss
under Coverage A, the parties must have the loss appraised upon written demand of either party.
(R., p. 112.) That appraisal process was demanded and carried out in accordance with the terms
ofthe Policy and a signed, written letter agreement dated June 2, 2010 ("Letter Agreement").
(R., pp. 187-188; see also Ex. B to Addendum.) This Letter Agreement made various agreed
upon modifications to the appraisal process and loss settlement provisions. The agreed upon
appraiser determined the amount ofloss under Coverage A to be $205,757.63. (R., p. 217.)
This appraisal amount was paid by State Farm Fire.5
Despite there being no third party property damage or bodily injury claim against the
Linfords and despite being paid the total amount of the fire loss as determined by the joint
appraiser pursuant to the agreed upon appraisal process, the Linfords claim on appeal: (1) that
State Farm Fire owed the Linfords a defense in the Dave's v. Linfords' lawsuit which seeks

4Third party coverage regards a liability claim against the insured for property or bodily
injury damages suffered by a third party and caused by the insured. Third party coverage
provides an indemnity for and a duty to defend these claims.
5State Farm Fire had paid, before the appraisal, its' estimate for replacement costs for the
fire damage to the house ($197,065.67). (R., p. 32.) State Farm Fire paid the additional amount
determined in the appraisal process of $8,691.96 immediately following the appraisal. (R., p.
219.)
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money damages for breach of two separate and distinct written construction contracts;6 and (2)
that State Farm Fire owes the Linfords whatever amount is ultimately determined to be due in the
separate Dave's v. Lirifords action for breach of the Fire Damage Contract.
The Linfords base their appeal upon the following arguments:
1.

2.
3.
4.

That a lawsuit by Dave's against the Linfords for breach of the Fire
Damage Contract triggers a duty to defend under the first party, property
damage coverage, Coverage A; or
Alternatively, that the lawsuit by Dave's triggers a duty to defend under
the liability coverage, Coverage L; and
That the appraisal process either does not apply to the Linfords' dispute
with State Farm Fire or it determined the wrong amount of loss; and
That the Fire Damage Contract between the Linfords and their contractor
(Dave's) establishes the amount ofloss owed by State Farm Fire
regardless of the outcome of the dispute resolution process set forth in
their contract with State Farm Fire.

These are frivolous, unreasonable or unsupportable arguments because: (1) by definition
and well established insurance principles, there is no duty to defend under a first party coverage
like Coverage A; (2) because Dave's Complaint does not allege that it suffered either property
damage or bodily injury, there is not even a possibility of a duty to defend under Coverage L; (3)
the Linfords expressly agreed to be bound by whatever amount was determined by appraisal; and
(4) a separate breach of contract lawsuit cannot, as a matter oflaw, determine the amount owed
under the Policy.

6These two contracts are between the Linfords and their contractor, Dave'S, to repair the
fire damage ("Fire Damage Contract") and to remodel other portions of the house ("Remodeling
Contract").
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Simply said, the Linfords are asking the judicial system to relieve them of their
contractual obligations to Dave's and make State Farm Fire pay those obligations and provide a
defense in a separate breach of contract lawsuit. They seek this result by contorting the meaning
of insurance law, the homeowners policy, the facts and their own Letter Agreement beyond any
reasonable interpretation.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
State Farm Fire generally agrees with the Linfords' Course of Proceedings.

C.

Statement of Facts.
State Farm Fire adds the following to the Linfords' Statement of Facts:
CORRECTION - Appellants' Brief, p. 1. The Linfords' home did not burn down

as a result of the fire. It was only partially damaged.
CORRECTION - Appellants' Brief, p. 8. The June 2,2010 letter agreement, does
not make "one minor modification." There are, in fact, nine modifications to the appraisal
process and loss settlement provisions of the Policy, including:
- the parties agree to resolve and set the amount of loss under
Coverage A of the Policy by appraisal;
- Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of
loss (amount ofloss);
- Mr. Berkson will provide a written appraisal ofthe amount of
loss to the insureds and State Farm;
- The parties agree to be bound by the written appraisal;
(R., p. 188.)
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Prior to completing repairs to the house, State Farm Fire estimated the actual cash value
("ACV") to repair the fire damage to be $153,751.40 (R., p. 132). On March 20, 2007, the
Linfords entered into the Fire Damage Contract with their own local contractor, Dave's, Inc.
("Dave's"), to repair the fire damage to the house based on the ACV estimate. (R., pp. 59-63.) It
specifically provides that Dave's would furnish all material and perform all the labor necessary to
complete the following work:

Rebuild home from fire damage, as for the State Farm
Insurance estimate of $153,751.40.
(R., p. 59) (emphasis in original).
On May 9, 2007, the Linfords entered into a separate Remodeling Contract. (R., pp. 6569.) In relevant part, this Remodeling Contract provides that Dave's would furnish all material
and perform all the labor necessary to complete the following work:

Any and all changes that are not paid for by State Farm Inc. Co.
(R., p. 65) (emphasis in original).
After completing repairs to the house, State Farm Fire estimated and paid ad additional
amount reflecting the replacement cost to repair the fire damage to the house for a total of
$197,065.67. (R., p. 187.) A dispute then arose between the Linfords and State Farm Fire
regarding the amount owed after completion of the repairs. (Id)
A dispute also arose between the Linfords and Dave's regarding the amount that Dave's
was to be paid for the services it provided to repair and remodel the fire damaged house. On
August 4, 2010, Dave's filed an Amended Verified Complaint ("Complaint") against the
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Linfords, in which Dave's asserted the Linfords owed an additional $91,357.82 for the
construction services provided under both the Fire Damage Contract and the Remodeling
Contract. (R., pp. 49-70.). The Complaint asserted three causes of action against the Linfords
based on these two contracts: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; and (3) unjust enrichment. (R., pp. 58-54.)
On September 9,2009, the Linfords' counsel tendered Dave's Complaint to State Farm
Fire for a defense and indemnification. (R., pp. 132-134.) At issue were two types of coverage
provided to the Linfords: (1) Section I - Your Property - Coverage A, which provides indemnity
for losses suffered by the Linfords (Id., pp. 105-107.); and (2) Section II - Your LiabilityCoverage L - Personal Liability, which provides a defense and indemnity for claims asserted
against the Linfords for property damage or bodily injuries suffered by third parties. (R., 113114.) On November 11,2009, State Farm Fire sent correspondence to the Linfords explaining
that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Linfords for the claims asserted by Dave's.
(R. pp. 153-155.)
The Linfords then filed a Third-Party Complaint against State Farm Fire asserting four
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) indemnification; (3) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) insurance bad faith. (R., pp. 70-84.)
In an effort to seek resolution of the first party claims for fire damage to the Linfords'
house as stated in the Third-Party Complaint, by Letter Agreement, counsel for the Linfords and
State Farm Fire agreed to have the amount of loss resolved by appraisal ("Letter Agreement").

(R., pp. 187-188; Appendix B.) That appraisal process was completed on October 13,2010. (R.,
-6-

p. 189.) The amount ofloss was determined in a written appraisal to be $205,757.63. (R., p.
217.) On November 1, 2010, State Farm Fire paid the Linfords, pursuant to the written appraisal,
an additional $8,691.96,. (R., pp. 218-219.)

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
State Farm Fire presents the following additional or more specific issues on appeal:
1.

Does State Farm Fire owe a duty to defend under Coverage A of the homeowners

policy (new issue raised by the Linfords on appeal)?
2.

Did the district court err in holding State Farm Fire had no duty to defend under

Coverage L of the homeowners policy?
3.

Did the district court err in holding there was no breach of the duty to indemnify

because the amount owed for all fire loss damage to the house was determined by appraisal and
paid by State Farm Fire?
4.

Did the district court err in dismissing the breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing and bad faith causes of action?
5.

Are the Linfords entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

6.

Is State Farm Fire entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-

1839(4) for the Linfords bringing a frivolous, unreasonable and/or unsupportable appeal?
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review on Appeal.
1.

Standard of Review for Grants of Summary Judgment.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as
the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,
475-476,50 P.3d 488, 490-491 (2002). Thus, this Court will review the record before the district
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de

novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there
exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Tusch Enterprise v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40,740 P.2d 1022, 1026
(1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c).

2.

Standard of Review for Denial of Summary Judgment.

"It is well settled in Idaho that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an

appealable order itself, nor is it reviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Tiegs v.

Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 484, 236 P.3d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 2010). "[A]n order denying a
motion for summary judgment is not a final order and direct appeal cannot be taken from it.
Moreover, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal from a
final judgment." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,376,973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999).
Therefore, this Court cannot consider Appellants' issue on appeal that the district court erred in
not granting summary judgment on their behalf.
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3.

Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues.

The interpretation of the legal effect of a policy of insurance is a questions of law over
which this Court exercises de novo review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214,
46 P.3d 510 (2002). Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination and effect of
a contractual provision is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. THI Co., 140
Idaho 253, 92 PJd 503 (2004). Interpreting contracts and applying law to undisputed facts
constitutes matters of law which this Court also reviews de novo. Fisk v. Royal Carribean
Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290, 292, 108 P.3d 990,992 (2004).
B.

Analysis.
1.

State Farm Fire Owes No Duty to Defend the Linfords.

The district court properly determined, based on the unambiguous terms of the policy,
that State Farm Fire had no duty to defend the Linfords against Dave's Complaint under
Coverage L (Personal Liability). (R., p. 370.) The district court did so based upon "the broadest
of readings" of Dave's Complaint that might bring any alleged claim against the Linfords within
the policy's liability coverage. Id On appeal, the Linfords challenge the district court's finding
of no duty to defend under Coverage L. They have also made a new argument on appeal -- that
State Farm Fire alternatively owes a duty to defend under Coverage A (Property Damage)?
Critical to the rejection of these frivolous arguments is a review of the language and well known
differences between Coverage A and Coverage L.

7This new argument/issue on appeal should not be reviewed. Kirkman v. Stoker, 134
Idaho 541,544,6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000).
-9-

a.

There is No Duty to Defend Under Coverage A .8
(1)

There is No Express Duty to Defend Provision Under Coverage A,
a First Party Coverage.

Nowhere in Section I, the section that includes Coverage A, is there any mention of or
reference to a duty to defend. This is not surprising since property insurance, or any first party
coverage, is not the type of insurance that provides an insured a defense should the insured be
sued for any reason, whether it be for property damage or bodily injury to others caused by the
fire, or even breach of a contract related to the fire. 9 The homeowners policy's property coverage
provides indemnity to the Linfords for the cost to repair or replace the fire loss damage to their
house (i.e., losses suffered by the Linfords themselves). It does not provide an express duty to
defend of any kind. To argue otherwise is frivolous and unsupportable and misunderstands basic
insurance law.

8The Linfords claim error because the district court only analyzed the duty to defend
under Coverage L. (Appellants' Brief, p. 19.) The district court cannot rule upon that which has
not been presented. At no time did the Linfords brief or argue to the district court that State
Farm Fire owed a duty to defend under Coverage A. All prior arguments were based on a duty to
defend under Coverage L. Other than for purposes of determining whether to award attorney fees
on appeal for making frivolous arguments, this issue on appeal should not be reviewed. See
Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. Partnership, 143 Idaho 227, 230,141 P.3d 1096,1099
(2006).
9To the extent an insurance policy has a duty to defend provision, it would be found in the
liability coverage.
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(2)

The Allegations in Dave's Complaint Do Not Reveal a Potential
for Liability Covered by the Policy.

The duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in whole or in
part, read broadly, reveal apotential for liability that would be covered by the insurance policy.

County of Kootenai v. The Western Casualty and Surety Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910, 750 P.2d 87,
89 (1988). Consequently, the only documents to be reviewed to determine whether a duty to
defend exists are Dave's Complaint and the insurance policy.
Coverage A is property insurance. The Linfords correctly identifY this type of insurance
as one "to indemnify another in whole or in part up to a specified amount for loss or damage to
designated property by fire." (Appellants' Brief, p. 13, citing CoUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., § 1:37
(1995).) (Emphasis added.) Property insurance provides first party coverage. First party "applies
to an insured or the insured's own property, such as ... fire insurance." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 8th Ed., p. 817 (2004). Coverage A is therefore a first party coverage for fire
losses incurred by the Linfords to their own property.
Coverage A specifically provides coverage for property damage to the Linfords' house.
(R., p. 101.) The losses insured by this coverage are "for accidental, direct, physical loss to the
property ... " (R., p. 105.)
Dave's Complaint against the Linfords seeks damages for the Linfords' breach of the Fire
Damage Contract and the Remodeling Contract. (R., pp. 49-58.) Specifically, the Complaint
alleges:

-11-

6

On or about January 19,2007, Defendant's [sic] residence suffered
from a fire, by reason of which Defendant [sic] needed home
repairs, renovation and remodeling to be conducted. . ..

7
Plaintiff is in the business of providing services as a general
contractor, and is licensed as such in the State ofIdaho. Plaintiff's
services include, but are not limited to, providing home repairs,
renovation and remodeling.
8
On or about March 20, 2007, Plaintiff and Defendant [sic] entered
in to [sic] an [sic] written agreement whereunder Plaintiff would
provide such services and materials needed to repair, renovate and
remodel Defendant's [sic] residence as it related to the fire damage
the home suffered. '"
9
On or about May 9, 2007, Plaintiff and Defendant [sic] entered in
to [sic] an [sic] written agreement whereunder Plaintiff would
provide such services and materials needed to renovate and
remodel Defendant's [sic] residence as it related to other parts of
Defendant's [sic] home that did not suffer fire damage.
11
Despite the foregoing, Defendant [sic] has failed and refused to
fully compensate Plaintiff in accordance with their abovereferenced written agreements. The amount due and owing to
Plaintiff by Defendant [sic], together with accrued interest as set
forth in the agreements, as of June 4, 2009 is $91,357.82.

(R., pp. 51-52.) Dave's Complaint does not allege an accidental loss that resulted in property
damage or bodily injury to Dave's. It does not allege that Dave's suffered a direct, physical loss
of any kind. Nor does it allege that it seeks damages for bodily injury or property damage to the
Linfords or their property. It is clearly and unequivocally a breach of contract complaint for
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which there is no coverage, let alone a potential for coverage. Consequently, under the "potential
liability for coverage" test for determining whether the Complaint allegations even remotely
touch on a covered liability, Dave's Complaint fails utterly.
The Linfords themselves identify Coverage A as an indemnity coverage for loss or
damage to their own property. (R., p. 13.) But they utterly misapply the common and
unambiguous understanding of how and to what this coverage applies. From this indemnity
coverage the Linfords seek a defense to a breach of contract lawsuit seeking monetary damages
suffered by someone other than themselves (Dave's) and for something other than bodily injury
or property. Coverage A is indemnity only and does not in any manner provide for a duty to
defend the insured against any lawsuit, especially a breach of contract lawsuit. At the end of the
day, the only issues that will be decided in the Dave's v. Lirifords action is whether the Linfords
have breached the Fire Damage and Remodeling Contracts and the amount of damages owed, if
any, under those contracts to Dave's. There is no "potential for liability" duty to defend against
these allegations under Coverage A. To claim otherwise is frivolous and unsupportable.
(3)

A Duty to Indemnify Does Not Create an Implied Duty to Defend
Under Coverage A.

The Linfords argue, without any support in the law, that there is an automatic duty to
defend when there is a duty to indemnify. (Appellants' Brief, p. 20.) The Linfords base this
frivolous argument on the theory that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify, if there is a narrower duty to indemnify, ipso Jacto there is a duty to defend. (Jd)
This circular argument is not true even in its broadest sense. First, Coverage A is a first party
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property damage coverage. This type of insurance only indemnifies and does not provide a
defense. Under the Linfords' theory, all indemnity-only insurance coverages would be converted
into liability coverages simply because they offer the narrower duty to indemnify.JO If there is no
express duty to defend provision, the contract cannot be re-written to include one. See Lovey v.

Regence Blueshield o/Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41,72 P.3d 877, 881 (2009) (courts do not posses
the roving power to rewrite contracts).
Second, this argument makes even less sense in the context of this appeal. Coverage A
does not even have the narrower duty to indemnify the Linfords for any breach of contract
damages that may be awarded to Dave's in its lawsuit. The only duty to indemnify is for damage
to the Linfords' property. A non-existent duty to indemnify damages arising out of the breach of
contract complaint cannot trigger a non-existent duty to defend that claim. I I
There is no duty to defend under Coverage A by definition, by contract interpretation or
by operation of well established law. The Linfords' new attempt to create one is frivolous,
unreasonable and unsupportable.

JOlt would also transmute the standard fire policy set forth in Idaho Code § 41-2401 into a
personal liability policy.
"Indeed, there cannot even be an implied duty to defend as argued by the Linfords
because there is not even apotential for liability revealed by Dave's Complaint.
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b.

The Express Duty to Defend Provision Under Coverage L was Not
Triggered by Dave's Complaint.

Unlike Coverage A, Coverage L has an express duty to defend provision.

COVERAGE L - PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which
this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will:

2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice.
(R., p. 113.) Like Coverage A, there is no duty to defend triggered by Dave's Complaint under

Coverage L.
The same test applied above to Coverage A applies to whether there is a duty to defend
under Coverage L. The issue is whether Dave's Complaint reveals apotential for some liability
covered by the homeowners policy.
(1)

The Undisputed Facts and Clear Policy Language Preclude a Duty
to Defend Under Coverage L.

Coverage L is personal liability insurance. Commonly referred to as casualty insurance,
the Linfords properly identifY this type of insurance to be "insurance against loss through
accidents or casualties resulting in bodily injury or death". (Appellants' Brief, p. 13, citing
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., § 1:28 (1995).) (See also R., p. 113.) Casualty insurance also
includes damage to property. This coverage applies to bodily injury or property damage to
others. (R., p. 115.) (Exclusion 2. b.) This type of insurance protects an insured if he or she
causes the bodily injury or property damage to third parties.
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Liability insurance is a third party coverage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 8th Ed., p. 817
(2004). ("[a]n agreement to cover a loss resulting from the insured's liability to a third party .. ,
. Also termed third-party insurance; ... ") Coverage L is therefore for claims asserted by third
parties against the Linfords resulting from their liability. Coverage L, under the terms of the
homeowners policy, requires that the covered loss be for property damage or bodily injury
suffered by these third parties. Therefore, Dave's suit must be based on allegations against the
Linfords "because of' their personal liability for property damage or bodily injury suffered by
Dave's.
In order to trigger a defense, Dave's lawsuit against the Linfords must allege "damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies .... " (R., p. 113.)
The Linfords do not claim that Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' bodily injury.
They argue, however, that Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' property damage to
their house. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 22,26.) This argument is false - Dave's Complaint seeks
damages because the Linfords failed to pay for services rendered.
"Property damage" is specifically defined in the Linfords' homeowners policy as
"physical damage to or destruction oftangible property, including loss of use of this property .
." (R., p. 100.) The damages sought in Dave's Complaint must also be "caused by an
occurrence". (R., p. 113.) The homeowners policy defines occurrence as "an accident". (R., p.

100.)
Dave's Complaint allegations are not "because of' physical damage to or destruction of
any of his tangible property. Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' a breach of contract
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by the Linfords leading to economic damages suffered by Dave's or, stated another way,
"because of' the LInfords' decision not to pay what is owed under their contracts with Dave's.
Even if the breach of contract damages were "because of' property damage, the independent
clause "caused by an occurrence" requires that the damages (regardless of whether they are for
bodily injury, property damages or breach of contract) be caused by an accident. It is certainly no
accident the Linfords did not pay Dave's. A breach of contract is not, and cannot be, an accident
and, therefore, cannot be an occurrence as required by Coverage L.
The plain meaning of "because of' within the context of the duty to defend provision and
the liability section of the policy does not encompass Dave's Complaint. Dave's Complaint was
not brought "because of' physical damage to its property caused by an accident. Dave's
Complaint was brought "because of' the Linfords' breach of the Fire Damage and Remodeling
Contracts by failing to pay for services rendered.
From the common and well established understanding of liability insurance, the Linfords
attempt to extract a duty to defend a breach of contract lawsuit that makes no allegations that a
Third Party suffered property damage or bodily injury from the fire or that these damages were
caused by the Linfords' negligence. Neither the alleged breach of contract or the damages sought
trigger Coverage L, let alone a duty to defend under Coverage L.
(2)

Well Settled Law Precludes a Duty to Defend Under Coverage L.

In addition to the Linfords' twisted interpretation and application of the duty to defend,
they ignore well-settled law. This Court has previously made it clear that a breach of contract
complaint does not trigger coverage under a liability policy.
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Both the amended complaint and the district court's instructions to
the jury indicate that the Harper v. MVP lawsuit was an action for
breach of contract, and did not involve any claim for damages in
tort. MVP has failed to demonstrate that damage to property was
at issue in the underlying suit. The Harper v. MVP lawsuit was a
contract action, and there was no allegation of either "property
damage" or an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy.

Magic Valley Potato Shippers v. Continental Ins., 112 Idaho 1073, 1076-77, 739 P.2d 372,37576 (1987) (bold in original).12
Like the complaint in Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint is one for breach of contract. Like
the complaint in Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint does not allege any claim for damages in tort.
Like the complaint in Magic Valley, there are no allegations of "property damage" within the
meaning of the policy (i.e., property damage to the property of Dave's). Like the complaint in

Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint makes no allegation of an "occurrence" within the meaning of
the policy (Le., the Linfords caused, by accident, the damage suffered by Dave'S). It matters not
that the policy at issue in Magic Valley was a commercial general liability policy. (Appellants'

12COurtS in other jurisdictions have come to the same conclusions as this Court -- a breach
of contract claim cannot constitute an "occurrence" under policies triggered by an accident or an
occurrence. See Jakobson Shipyard, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 961 F.2d 387, 389 (2d
Cir.1992) (finding no accident where insured shipbuilder provided tug boat with defective
steering mechanism contrary to contract specifications); Pace Constr. Co. v. United States Fid &
Guar. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir.l991) (no accident where insured subcontractor
breached contractual duty to procure insurance for contractor); Oak Crest Constr. Co. v. Austin
Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Or. 620, 626, 998 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Or. 2000) (" ... there can be no
'accident,' within the meaning of a commercial liability policy, when the resulting damage is
merely a breach of contract..."); Nationwide Property & Cas. v. Comer, 559 F.Supp.2d 685,692
(S.D. W.Va. 2008) (insurer did not have a duty to indemnify or defend insured vendors against
purchasers' claim for rescission based on alleged breach of contract, since breaches of contracts
were not accidents and therefore not occurrences as defined by the homeowner's policy, which
defined occurrence to include property damage resulting from an accident).
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Brief, p. 23.) The same issue was extant - does a breach of contract lawsuit create even the
potential of coverage under a liability policy? The clear and unequivocal answer under long
established Idaho law is "no".
Nevertheless, the Linfords argue that Magic Valley is distinguishable because it discussed
an exclusion for breach of contract and State Farm Fire could have drafted a similar exclusion in
order to make Magic Valley applicable in this case. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-24.) The breach
of contract exclusion was not necessary to the finding that there was no coverage in Magic

Valley. Rather, the contract exclusion was supporting evidence that there was no genuine issue
of material fact on the coverage issue.
Regardless, Coverage L has an applicable "owned property" exclusion and therefore, like

Magic Valley, provides supporting evidence that there is no duty to defend the Linfords against
Dave's Complaint. This exclusion provides:
2. Coverage L does not apply to:
b.

Property damage to property currently owned by any insured;

(R., p. 114-115.) Exclusion 2.b. excludes liability from coverage for property damage to the
Linfords' property. This excludes from liability coverage any lawsuit brought "because of'
property damage to the insured's property. As in Magic Valley, because there is a similar in
affect exclusion for fire loss to property owned by the Linfords, there is further evidence that
there is no potential for liability coverage and no duty to defend.
The frivolousness of the Linfords' position on appeal regarding a duty to defend under
either Coverage A or L cannot be stated more clearly than in their own words.
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This distinction (between property insurance and liability
insurance) is important because contracts of insurance should be
considered in view of their general objectives. E.g., Rauert, 61
Idaho at 680, 106 P.2d at 10 18. Property insurance, such as a
homeowners policy, is purchased to protect an asset from loss or
destruction. Casualty insurance, on the other hand, is purchased to
insure "against loss through accidents or casualties resulting in
bodily injury or death." Couch on Ins., 3d. § 1:28. A business
would not expect its casualty insurance to protect it from breach of
contract, but homeowners would most certainly believe that their
homeowners insurance would provide a defense when a suit is
initiated against them "because of' fire damage caused to their
home.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 24.y3 The Linfords properly describe the general objectives of Coverage A
- it is purchased to protect their assets from loss or destruction. The Linfords correctly identifY
the general objectives of Coverage L -- it is insurance purchased to insure them against loss
through accidents or casualties resulting in property damage. The Linfords properly state that
casualty insurance does not cover breach of contract claims against businesses. Where the
Linfords go horribly wrong is when they immediately ignore these general objectives and axioms
of insurance law and extend property insurance coverage to a claim (Dave's) that is not for loss
or destruction of the Linfords' assets and extend personal liability insurance coverage to
homeowners for breach of contract claims as long as the contract at issue has some connection to

13The Linfords admit elsewhere in their Brief that "a policy designed to cover injuries to
third parties will not cover breach of contract." (Appellants' Brief, p. 25.) But the Linfords
claim that this issue is not present in this case by redefining the issue (and insurance law) to
"whether State Farm has a duty to protect the Linfords from an alleged breach of contract that
they did not wish to enter into in the first place and only did so "because of' a covered
occurrence". (Jd.) Aside from its nonsensical syntax, accepting this argument would stand
insurance law on its head.
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a fire loss. The only basis the Linfords give for extending coverage to homeowners for that
which they claim is only available to businesses is the parties' expectations. This Court long ago
did away with the parties expectations as a basis for coverage. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of

Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 450,65 P.3d 184, 191 (2003).
The Linfords cannot seek a defense to a suit brought against them for breach of contract
that has nothing to do with protecting their home from fire loss or defending against a claim for
property damage accidentally caused by the Linfords and suffered by a third party. The suit by
Dave's was filed "because of' the Linfords' failure to pay money due under their contract with
Dave's. There is no duty to defend under Coverage L. Pursuant to the well established rules of
insurance contract interpretation and well established law in Idaho, there is no duty to defend
owed by State Farm Fire against the breach of contract allegations in Dave's Complaint under
either Coverage A or Coverage L. The arguments the Linfords make on appeal are frivolous,
unreasonable and unsupportable.

2.

State Farm Fire's Duty to Indemnify for Fire Loss to the Linfords' House
was Met Upon Payment of the Appraisal Amount.

State Farm Fire acknowledged the fire loss and its duty to indemnifY under Coverage A
on the day of the fire. (R., p. 271-277.) After acknowledging the fire loss and before repairs to
the house were completed, State Farm Fire paid an estimated actual cash value ofthe repairs in
the amount of$153,751.40. (R., p. 365.) This payment was made pursuant to paragraph l.a.(1)
of Coverage A - Dwelling Loss Settlement provision of the homeowners policy (hereinafter
referred to as "ACV Paragraph"). (R., p. 109.) After repairs to the house were completed on
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April 25, 2008, State Farm Fire paid an additional amount of$43,314.27, representing the
replacement cost of the covered repairs. (R., pp. 58; 366.) This brought the total payment
amount to $197,065.67. This payment was made pursuant to paragraph l.a.(2) of the Coverage
A - Dwelling Loss Settlement provision (hereinafter referred to as "RC Paragraph"). (R., p.
109.)
A dispute arose over whether the Linfords were entitled to another, additional payment
for replacement cost of the repairs. (R., p. 187.) On May 7, 2010, State Farm Fire "demanded
that the amount of the loss under Coverage A be set/determined by appraisal." (Jd) The
Linfords agreed to appraisal. (Appellants' Brief, p. 28.) The Linfords and State Farm Fire then
signed a Letter Agreement modifYing the contractual appraisal and loss settlement provisions of
the Policy. (R., p. 188.) Of note was the substantive modification that expressly defined how the
amount ofloss was to be determined by the appraiser.
Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of
the loss (amount ofloss).
(R., p. 188.) This Letter Agreement misdefined the calculation of the amount of the loss used in
either the ACV or RC Paragraphs. The parties further agreed that the appraiser would provide "a
written appraisal of the amount of loss to the insured" and "to be bound by the written appraisal."

14The Linfords state that the district court "correctly" noted the Letter Agreement follows
the terms of the Appraisal Paragraph with one modification: the parties jointly appointed one
appraiser and State Farm Fire agreed to pay all of his fees and expenses. (Appellants' Brief, p.
28.) (Citing the district court's decision, R., p. 372.) The Linfords misinterpret this part the
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The appraiser issued his written appraisal on October 13,2010. (R., p. 189-217.) In the
cover letter the appraiser indicated that the appraisal "has been completed in accordance with the
directives given in the letter dated June 2, 2010 [Letter Agreement], by Elam & Burke, as was
agreed to by all parties." (R., p. 189.) (bracketed information added.) The appraiser determined
that the amount ofloss to which the parties agreed to be bound was $205,757.63. (R., p. 217.)
State Farm Fire had already paid $197,065.67. (R., p. 32.) Based on the agreement to be bound
by the appraisal, State Farm Fire paid an additional $8,691.96. (R., p. 218.)
The analysis of whether State Farm Fire breached its duty to indemnifY can, and should,
stop here. The amount of indemnity owed was determined in an agreed upon alternative dispute
resolution proceeding. The amount was determined by an agreed upon formula. The parties
agreed to be bound by the process and the result. State Farm Fire promptly paid the additional
amount of indemnity owed. The Linfords accepted the additional proceeds from this agreed
upon appraisal process. The district court properly determined there was no breach of the duty to
indemnifY based on the unambiguous policy provisions, the undisputed facts and the terms of the
Letter Agreement. Nevertheless, the Linfords ask the Court to relieve them of their promise to be
bound by their agreement and allow them to seek breach of contract and bad faith damages
against State Farm Fire. State Farm Fire did not breach its duty to indemnifY the Linfords. The

district court's decision and then use this misinterpretation to distance themselves from the other
modifications made by the Letter Agreement, including agreeing to be bound by the appraiser's
calculation of the amount ofloss. A proper reading of the district court's decision indicates that
the district court was discussing one modification to the appointment process of three appraisers
and noted that this appointment process had f! modification. (R., p. 371-372.) On its face, the
Letter Agreement signed by the Linfords' counsel has nine modifications. (R., p. 188.)
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Linfords should be held to their agreement and dismissal of the duty to indemnifY should be
upheld.
a.

The Linfords are Bound by the Insurance Contract Dispute Resolution
Process (Appraisal).

Alternative dispute resolution is a favored remedy. International Association 0/
Firefighters Local No. 672 v. City o/Boise, 136 Idaho 162, 168,30 P.3d 940, 946 (2001)

(discussing arbitration). 15 Alternative dispute resolution allows parties to settle their disputes
without expending time and unnecessary expense on needless litigation. Bingham County
Commission v. Interstate Electric Company, 105 Idaho 36, 41, 665 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1983)

(discussing arbitration).
The essential nature of arbitration is that the parties, by consensual
agreement, have decided to substitute the final and binding
judgment of an impartial entity conversant with the business world
for the judgment of the courts. They seek to avoid the cost, in both
time and money, of formal judicial dispute resolution. But when
the parties bargain for the binding decision of an arbitrator, they
necessarily accept the fact that his interpretation of the facts, the
law, and the equities of the situation may not be entirely
satisfactory to them.
Id., 105 Idaho at 42, 665 P .2d at 1052.

The Linfords argue on appeal that they are not bound by the appraisal process because it
did not determine what they were owed under the homeowners policy; instead, that amount is to
be determined by a jury in a different lawsuit based upon breach of a separate written contract

!SIn the setting of this case, there is no reasoned distinction between appraisal and
arbitration. They are similar in that both can bind the parties regarding the extent or amount of
loss.
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entered into with a third party (Dave's). (Appellants' Brief, pp. 29, fn 4; 30.) The basis of this
argument is that "the appraisal determined the loss, not the amount spent to replace the damage".
(Jd) Consequently, the argument continues, the Appraisal Paragraph is irrelevant and the

Linfords are entitled to whatever amount is owed under Dave's Fire Damage Contract as
determined in Dave's lawsuit. (Jd.) The Linfords' arguments are based upon a tortured reading
of the insurance policy and upon either ignoring or otherwise distancing themselves from the
provisions of the Appraisal Paragraph and Letter Agreement. 16
The Appraisal Paragraph in the policy states the "[w]ritten agreement signed by any two
of these three [appraisers] shall set the amount of the loss. (R., p. 112.) (bracketed information
and emphasis added.) The Letter Agreement modified this to a single appraiser. (R., p. 188.)
The Linfords agreed to this in part to save money, one ofthe express purposes of ADR, because
State Farm Fire agreed to pay all costs and fees ofthe appraisal. (R., pp. 187-188.) The
Linfords, who were represented by counsel during the Letter Agreement negotiations, also agreed
to be bound by the appraisal process. (R., p. 188.) Clearly, the parties bargained for an
alternative dispute resolution process. By agreeing to appraisal and to be bound by the process,
the Linfords gave up their right to be dissatisfied with or ignore the process. (See Jd.)
Alternatively, the Linfords argue that the Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to this
dispute because the applicable loss settlement provision is missing a word. (Appellants' Brief, p.

16Whatever amount is determined in Dave's v. Linfords is not binding on State Farm Fire
because it is not a party. Nor does the policy say it will pay what is determined in a third party
case.
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30.) In order to fully understand and then dispel this frivolous argument, the relevant, clear and
unambiguous policy language must be explored.
There are two types of payments owed to an insured for property losses to dwellings
under the subject homeowners policy property coverage. The first is known as actual cash value
which is estimated and paid early in the process in order to provide the insured with funds to
begin repairing the fire damage. The loss provision paragraph applicable to an actual cash value
payment is paragraph 1.a.(1) (ACV Paragraph) and reads as follows:
a.

We will pay the cost to repair or replace with similar
construction and for the same use of the premises ... the
damaged part of the property covered ... subject to the
following:
(1)

Until actual repair or replacement is completed, we
will pay only the actual cash value at the time of the
loss of the damaged part of the property, up to the
applicable limit of liability shown in the
Declarations not to exceed the cost to repair or
replace the damaged part ofthe property; ... "

(R., p. 109.) This estimate of damages applies until the repair of the fire loss is completed.
Before repairs were completed, State Farm Fire estimated and paid to the Linfords ACV in the
amount of$153,751.40. (R., p. 365.)
Once the fire damage repair has been completed, a different payment amount is made if
additional amounts are warranted by the circumstances of the repair (i.e., RC is more than ACV).
This is for replacement cost under paragraph 1.a.(2) (RC Paragraph).
(2)

When the repair or replacement is actually
completed, we will pay the covered additional
amount you actually and necessarily spend to repair
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or replace the damaged part of the property, or an
amount up to the applicable limit of liability shown
in the Declarations, whichever is less;

(R., p. 109.) After repairs were completed, State Farm Fire calculated and paid an additional
amount of $43,314.27 in replacement cost, which subsumed the ACV amount already paid, for a
total amount of loss of$197,065.67. (R., p. 1.)
The Linfords agree the RC Paragraph is the applicable provision because the repairs to
the house have been completed. (Appellants' Brief, p. 29.) But, the Linfords argue that the
Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to the RC Paragraph and only applies to the ACV Paragraph.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 30.) Therefore, the Linfords argue the appraisal is not binding upon them
and/or it determined the actual cash value and therefore the appraisal is irrelevant to the amount
owed now that repairs have been concluded. This house of cards is built upon the absence of a
single word in the RC Paragraph - "loss".
First, whether the Appraisal Paragraph applies to the ACV Paragraph or the RC
Paragraph is a red herring argument. The Letter Agreement establishes that the amount of loss to
be determined by appraisal "was the cost to repair damages, caused by fire, as if he was a
contractor on the date of the loss (amount of loss)". (R., p. 188.) Whether the Appraisal
Paragraph applies to a determination of the amount of loss under the ACV or RC Paragraphs is
irrelevant. Indeed, the parties agreed the appraisal process was to determine what was owed
under Coverage A, including what was actually and necessarily spent. The Letter Agreement
controls as to how the amount of loss is to be determined. The tortured route taken by the
Linfords to ignore their own agreement is prime evidence of the frivolous nature oftheir appeal.
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Second, even ignoring the Letter Agreement modification as the Linfords do, no
reasonable interpretation of the absence of the word "loss" in the RC Paragraph exempts the
dispute over how much is owed the Linfords from the appraisal dispute resolution process set
forth in the Appraisal Paragraph. On its face, it applies to all disputes over the amount of loss.
(R., p. 112.) Regardless ofthe label used by the Linfords, they are disputing the amount ofloss
owed to them under the homeowners policy. The Appraisal Paragraph unambiguously applies to
all disputes over the amount of loss whether the Linfords call it as ACV dispute, an RC dispute,
an actually and necessarily spent to repair dispute or a banana dispute.
The Linfords argue that the Appraisal Paragraph applies to the ACV Paragraph but not to
the RC Paragraph because the former has the word "loss" and the latter does not. The RC
Paragraph has no different purpose than the ACV Paragraph - to provide the parameters for
determining the amount of loss. The ACV Paragraph provides for determining the amount of
loss before repairs are completed; the RC Paragraph provides for determining the amount of loss
after repairs are completed.
In addition, the context ofthe RC Paragraph clearly establishes that it is used to
determine the amount of loss despite the absence of the word "loss" and is therefore subject to
the Appraisal Paragraph. The RC Paragraph is found in Section I - Loss Settlement. (R. p. 109.)
The introductory paragraph to that section states "[w]e will settle covered property losses
according to the following." (Id.) (Emphasis added.) The next subparagraph identifies itself as
"l.A. - Replacement Cost Loss Settlement - Similar Construction." (Id.) (Emphasis added.)
The RC Paragraph is a sub-subparagraph in Section I - Loss Settlement and it is under the
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introductory paragraph and under the Similar Construction Loss Settlement paragraph heading.

(Id) The next sub subparagraph modifies the RC Paragraph and also has the word "loss" in it.
(Jd) The Appraisal Paragraph says "amount of loss" or "amount of the loss" not once, but five

times. (R., p. 112.)
It is axiomatic that, when construing contract provisions, it must be done within the

context in which it occurs in the policy. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 147 Idaho 67,
70,205 P.3d 1203, 1206 (2009). Contract interpretation cannot be done in a vacuum. Yet the
Linfords do just that. The Linfords argue that because the word "loss" is in the ACV Paragraph,
is absent in the RC Paragraph, and because the purpose of the Appraisal Paragraph is to
determine the amount of "loss", the Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to the RC Paragraph.
The Linfords' "interpretation" of the absence of the word "loss" in the RC Paragraph ignores its
context, including the section heading, introductory paragraph, title to the paragraph of which it
is a subparagraph and the modifYing sub-subparagraph following the RC Paragraph. All of these
contain the word "loss". In context, the absence of the word "loss" does not exempt the dispute
from appraisal. No reasonable interpretation of the policy can conclude that the RC Paragraph is
not a paragraph designed to determine the amount of loss as referred to in the Appraisal
Paragraph.
Just as unreasonable is the Linfords' argument that the Letter Agreement is irrelevant to
this appeal.
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b.

The June 2, 2010 Letter Agreement is the Operative Document for
Determining the Amount Owed Under the Duty to IndemnifY.

The Linfords' compare and contrast the language in the Appraisal Paragraph and the
Letter Agreement and come to the astounding conclusion that other than the modification from
three to one appraiser, they "are exactly the same." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-29.) Therefore,
the Linfords continue, "only an examination of the language contained in the Appraisal
Paragraph of the Policy is relevant to the current dispute" and since the Appraisal Paragraph only
applies to ACV disputes, both the Letter Agreement and the Appraisal Paragraph are irrelevant.
(Id. at p. 29.) It is through this tortured "logic" the Linfords distance themselves from their own

agreements and contracts and claim they are not bound by the appraisal amount.
The Letter Agreement cannot be ignored or compared away. It makes not one procedural
modification, but a total of nine modifications to the Appraisal Paragraph and/or loss settlement
provisions of the Policy, many of which are substantive. These include:
- the parties agree to resolve and set the amount of loss under.
Coverage A of the Policy by appraisal;
- Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of
loss (amount of loss);
- Mr. Berkson will provide a written appraisal of the amount of
loss to the insureds and State Farm;
- the parties agree to be bound by the written appraisal ....
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(R., p. 188.) (Emphasis added.) The Letter Agreement makes it clear that the end result of the
appraisal process was to resolve the extant dispute between State Farm Fire and the Linfords. 17 It
was to establish the amount of loss owed to the Linfords under Coverage A. The Letter
Agreement required a written appraisal ofthe amount ofloss "to the insured", again emphasizing
that the appraisal was to determine what was owed to the Linfords and thereby resolve the
dispute between the parties. It sets forth the precise method that is to be used by the appraiser in
determining the amount of loss. It is undisputed that the appraiser used that method. (R., p.
189.) This method became the agreed upon loss settlement provision. The Linfords agreed to be
bound by the written appraiser's determination of the amount owed under the Coverage A. State
Farm Fire paid the additional amount owed as determined by the appraisal. The Linfords
accepted the benefits of the process but now refuse to be bound by it. Instead, they ask the Court
to relieve them of their agreements, rewrite the insurance policy and allow them to make State
Farm Fire guarantors of any judgment entered in Dave's lawsuit. The Letter Agreement is a
primary operative document. The Linfords' attempts to minimize, ignore or otherwise make this
key document irrelevant are frivolous and unreasonable.
Perhaps one of the most disingenuous arguments against being bound by the written
appraisal is the Linfords' argument that the appraiser did not determine the amount of loss owed
them, but instead determined "a different estimate of the actual cash value". (Appellants' Brief,

17The Third Party Complaint by the Linfords against State Farm Fire makes it clear the
extant dispute was over how much more, if any, the Linfords were entitled to receive for repairs
ofthe fire damage to their house. (R., pp. 75-84.)
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p. 31.) (quoting from Tr. p. 24.) First, ACV is at issue only until repairs are completed. Once
repairs are completed the only amount at issue is replacement cost. It is undisputed ACV was
paid and repairs were completed long before either the Letter Agreement or the appraisal.
Consequently, at the time the Letter Agreement was signed and when the appraisal occurred,
ACV was not, and could not be, at issue. To argue that the written appraisal determined a
"different" ACV ignores their own Third Party Complaint describing the dispute, ignores the
undisputed fact that repairs were completed, ignores the express provisions of the Letter
Agreement and contorts the policy language beyond any reasonable interpretation.
Second, based on their arguments on appeal it is now clear that the Linfords had no
intention of being bound by the Letter Agreement or the appraisal results either before, during or
after agreeing to participate. The Linfords state they decided to "go along with the appraisal"
because: (1) they needed to comply with the following provision: "[n]o action shall be brought
against [State Farm Fire] unless there has been compliance with the policy provision,,18; and (2)
they got State Farm Fire to pay all costs and expenses of the appraisal. (Appellants' Brief, p. 28.)

(See also, Tr. p. 24.)
In other words, knowing they had already been paid ACV, and knowing repairs had been
completed, and knowing the ACV Paragraph was no longer operative, and knowing they had
accepted a supplemental payment after repairs were completed (which by definition could only
be payment of replacement costs), and knowing the Letter Agreement was signed after repairs

18This provision relates to an insured's ability to sue the insurer. Consequently, the
Linfords agreed to appraisal in order to continue their suit against State Farm Fire.
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were completed, and knowing the appraisal occurred after the repairs were completed, and
accepting even more money as a result of the appraisal, the Linfords agreed to go along with an
appraisal process they thought was unnecessary and irrelevant to the resolution of the actual
dispute between State Farm Fire and them. The motives for going along with the appraisal are
far more sinister when examined in the light of their own arguments - if State Farm Fire was
willing to foot the bill for the unnecessary appraisal, it allowed them to continue their suit against
State Farm Fire for breach of contract and bad faith.
Third, at no time prior to the appraisal, not even at the time of negotiating the Letter
Agreement modifications, did the Linfords inform State Farm Fire of their view that the appraisal
was meaningless and/or was merely a necessary step to avoid dismissal of their action. This
Court has held that if there is a concern regarding an alternative dispute resolution process at the
time of contracting, and nothing is said or done to address that concern, the parties are
nevertheless bound by the alternative dispute resolution results regardless of the validity of the
concerns. See, Martel v. Bul/otti, 138 Idaho 451,196-7,65 P.3d 192,455-6 (2003) (The
potential bias of the architect selected to settle the dispute was known at the time of contracting
so the parties were bound by the contract dispute resolution process and result.) Here, the parties
contracted to make modifications to the alternative dispute resolution process and to the loss
settlement provisions in the insurance policy by Letter Agreement. The parties were already in a
dispute over the amount owed. The Linfords had reservations/concerns about the appraisal
process. Nevertheless, the Linfords agreed to appraisal as modified. Based on their silence, the
Linfords are bound by the written appraisal and cannot now complain about the process or the
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result. See JR. Simp/ot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110,350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960). (This
Court cannot make for the Linfords a better agreement than they themselves were satisfied to
make.)
The Linfords' hypothetical in their Briefpoints out the fallacy of their position regarding
appraisal in the present matter. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 32-33.) The Linfords hypothesis is based
on the following assumptions: (1) a friend repaired the fire damage but waived overhead and
profit; (2) the Linfords only paid $150,000.00 under that arrangement; (3) this amount was
challenged by State Farm Fire as too high; and (4) the appraiser found the cost of repairs to be
$200,000.00. Based on these facts, the Linfords hypothesize that State Farm Fire would pay only
$150,000.00 because that was all the Linfords actually paid.
State Farm Fire's conduct in this case proves the hypothesis wrong. State Farm Fire did
not ignore the appraisal award and choose a lower amount to pay. By their own admission, the
Linfords have only paid Dave's $173,369.99 under the Fire Damage Contract. (R., pp. 53; 176;
343-344.) Under the Linfords' hypothesis and interpretation of the policy, State Farm Fire could
have paid this amount as the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair fire damage at the
time of the appraisal. It paid, however, the higher appraisal amount. State Farm Fire complied
with its agreement to be bound by the appraisal. The only parties who have failed to live up to
their agreement is the Linfords.
The Linfords have contracted away their right to challenge either the appraisal process or
the appraiser's decision except on limited grounds not raised below or on appeal. Nevertheless,
the Linfords have done exactly what they contracted away - challenge its application to them.
-34-

The Linfords are bound by the results ofthe appraisal and to say otherwise is frivolous and
unsupportable.
c.

The Linfords' Reliance on Kane is Misplaced. J9

The Linfords argue the district court's indemnity holding should be overturned based on a
so-called "admission" made by State Farm Fire in a class action filed in a foreign jurisdiction
(Pennsylvania). (Appellants' Brief, p. 34.) (citing Kane v. State Farm Fire, et a!., 841 A.2d 1038
(Penn. 2003).) Kane is unpersuasive and irrelevant to this appeal and, worst of all, the
"admission" was not made by State Farm Fire.
First, the Kane case dealt with a different policy provision (ACV) and a different issue
(deducting depreciation from actual cash value) at a different point in the repair process (before
repairs had been completed). This precludes Kane's use against State Farm Fire in this case.
Second, the Linfords rely on the following as the "admission" made in the Kane case:
Finally, Kane noted that "there is no concern ... that the insured
will not be made whole" because State Farm has "conceded
liability for replacement costs once Appellants undertake to repair
or replace the damage to their properties." (Id. at 1050) (emphasis
added). In the present case, State Farm is essentially retracting its
admission in Kane.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 35.) Kane is a class action lawsuit against nine insurance companies. (Id.,
at 1038.) State Farm Fire was only one of those nine insurance companies. (Id.) The Kane court
put the insurance companies into two groups based on the similarity of the policy language.
State Farm Fire was in "group one". (Id. at 1042.) The admission the Linfords lifted from Kane

J9

A copy ofthe Kane decision is attached to the Addendum hereto as Exhibit C.
-35-

and attributed to State Farm Fire comes from that part of the decision examining policies issued
by "group two" (Allstate, Metropolitan, Ace Fire and Markel). (Id. at 1050.) Not only do the
Linfords' misapply Kane, the so called admission is not even an admission by State Farm Fire.
This is the epitome of the frivolous, unreasonable and unsupportable nature of the Linfords'
appeal. 20

3.

The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Bad Faith Causes of Action.

If the dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action is upheld, neither the breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the bad faith causes of action survive.
a.

The Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Cause of Action is Duplicative.

The Linfords claim that the district court erred in dismissing the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing cause of action "[gJiven State Farm's actions and the admissions in
Kane." (Appellants' Brief, p. 38.) As discussed above, State Farm Fire's actions in not
providing a defense to the allegations in Dave's Complaint or providing additional payment
under the fire loss property provisions is not a breach of contract, express or implied. Moreover,
the so-called admission in Kane upon which the Linfords base yet another cause of action is not a
binding admission or even an admission made by State Farm Fire. The appeal from dismissal of
this cause of action is without support. Indeed, appeal from the dismissal of this cause of action
is frivolous and unreasonable in the face of clear Idaho law.

2°The Linfords not only used this inapplicable "admission" as a basis for alleging a breach
of contract, they argue "it also establishes that State Farm is acting in bad faith." (Id.)
-36-

In Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841
(1991), this Court ruled that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
a stand alone cause of action, separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim:
A violation ofthe implied covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result
in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor does it result
in separate contract damages, unless such damages specifically relate to the breach
of the good faith covenant. To hold otherwise would result in a duplication of
damages awarded for a breach of the same contract.

Id. at 289,824 P.2d at 864; see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho 714,
721, 918 P .2d 583, 590 (1986).21 Regardless of whether this Court upholds dismissal of the
breach of contract cause of action, the dismissal of this cause of action should be upheld because
it cannot be a separate cause of action, as a matter of law.
b.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed the Bad Faith Cause of Action.

If the Court agrees that State Farm Fire did not owe a duty to defend and has fully paid
for fire loss damages, then there is no breach of the insurance contract. Ifthere is no breach of
contract, there cannot be bad faith, as a matter of law. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 137 Idaho 173, 179,45 P.3d 829,835 (2002).
4.

The Linfords are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

The Linfords seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) and (4)
and Idaho Code § 12-123. The Linfords have failed to provide any argument, basis or support for
an award of attorney fees under either Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) or Idaho Code § 12-123. No

21This same Idaho case law was presented to the Linfords in the district court, yet they
refuse to take heed.
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attorney fees on appeal should be considered for the Linfords under either of these statutes. See
LA.R., Rule 35(a)(5).
The Linfords also seek attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) based on
State Farm Fire's refusal to accept the Linfords' tenders of the defense of Dave's lawsuit within
thirty days. (Appellants' Brief, p. 9.) The Linfords argue that these tenders triggered the duty to
defend and entitled the Linfords to the defense costs they incurred defending that action. First,
any such request is premature since there has been no determination that State Farm Fire owes
any amount to the Linfords.
Second, breach of the duty to defend allows the insured to seek attorney fees as damages
for breach of contract and not as statutory attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-183 9( 1). See
Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 149 Idaho 81, 86, 233 P.3d 12, 17 (2008). The
Linfords cannot double dip and seek attorney fees as damages and also seek them under Idaho
Code § 41-1839(1).
Of course, the fact that the Respondents are merely attempting to uphold the district
court's dismissal of all causes of action would be a further ground for denying the Linfords
attorney fees on appeal.

5.

State Farm Fire is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

State Farm Fire requests that it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9(4). This statute provides authority for an award of attorney
fees when this Court finds that the appeal was "brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) provides a basis for an
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award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132
Idaho 705, 711, 979 P.2d 107, 113 (1999). A case is considered frivolously appealed "if the law
is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148
(1999). Here, the law regarding the duties to defend and indemnify is well settled and was
correctly applied by the district court.
An award of fees is also appropriate where an appeal presents no meaningful issue on a
question of law but simply invites the appellate court to second guess the district court on
conflicting evidence. Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41
P.3d 242,256 (2001). The evidence that State Farm Fire owed a duty to defend or owed more
than the appraisal amount does not even rise to the level of conflicting evidence. The appeal is
instead a request of this Court to second guess the district court's application of undisputed facts
and its interpretation of the contracts and to overturn well established law without any good
reason for doing so. State Farm Fire is entitled to fees and costs on appeal because it was
brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and/or without foundation.

IV. CONCLUSION
The district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm Fire should be affirmed.
The district court's denial of the Linfords' motion for partial summary judgment should be
ignored. The Linfords' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied and State Farm
Fire's request should be granted.
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DATED this

-!i-

day of January, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ie!'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing document to be served as follows:

/{;.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
Facsimile

David P. Claiborne
Ringert Law Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773
(Attorney for Plaintiff)

U.S. Mail

Neil D. McFeeley
Corey J. Rippee
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow
& McKlveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

~Hand Delivery

_ _ Federal Express
Facsimile

(Attorneys for Third Party Plaintiffs/Appellants)
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"AU •• 1.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Home Office, Bloomington, Illinois 61710

A.

IHIUI4N"

Dupont Operations Center
P.O. Box 5000
Dupont, Washington 98327-5000

CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian of the
records pertaining to the issuance of policies issued by
state Farm Fire and Casualty Company of Bloomington, IL
that are processed by the Personal Lines Fire Division of the
Dupont operations Center, Dupont Washington.
Based on our available records, I further certify that the attached
Renewal Certificate prepared May 24, 2006 represents a true copy of
the policy provisions and coverages as of Jan 18, 2007
for policy 12-BX-7416-6 issued to Linford, D Richard & Lindsey

Sea Moore
Un erwriting Team Manager
S ate Farm Fire and Casualty Company
upont Operations Center
Dupont, WA 98327
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This policy is one of the broadest forms available today, and provides you with outstanding value for your insurance dollars.
However, we want to point out that every policy contains limitations and exclusions. Please read your policy carefully,

especially "losses Not Insured" and all exclusions:
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HOMEOWNERS POLICY

I

DECLARATIONS CONTINUED
We agree to provide the insurance described in this policy:

3. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; and

1. based on your payment of premium for the coverages you
chose;

4. this policy contains all of the agreements between you
and us and any of our agents.

2. based on your compliance with all applicable provisions
of this policy; and

Unless otherwise indicated in the application, you state that
during the three years preCeding the time of your application
for this insurance your Loss History and Insurance History
are as follows:

3. in reliance on your statements in these Declarations.
You agree, by acceptance of this policy, that:
1. you will pay premiums when due and comply with the
provisions of the policy;
2. the statements in these Declarations are your statements and are true;

1. Loss History: you have not had any losses, insured or
not; and
2. Insurance History: you have not had any insurer or
agency cancel or refuse to issue or renew similar insurance to you or any household member.

DEFINITIONS
"You" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the
Declarations. Your spouse is included if a resident of your
household. 'We", "us' and ·our" mean the Company shown
in the Declarations.
Certain words and phrases are defined as follows:
1. "bodily injury" means physical injury, sickness, or disease to a person. This includes required care, loss of
services and death resulting therefrom.
Bodily injury does not include:
a. any of the following which are communicable: disease. bacteria, parasite, virus, or other organism, any
of which are transmitted by any insured to any other
person;
b. the exposure to any such disease, bacteria, parasite,
virus, or other organism by any insured to any other
person; or
C.

emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation,
mental distress, mental injury, or any similar injury
unless it arises out of actual physical injury to some
person.

2. "business· means a trade, profession or occupation.
This includes farming.
3. "Declarations· means the policy Declarations, any
amended Declarations, the most recent renewal notice
or certificate, an Evidence of Insurance form or any
endorsement changing any of these.
4. "insured" means you and, if residents of your household:
a. your relatives; and
b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the
care of a person described above.
Under Section II, "insured" also means:
c. with respect to animals or watercraft to which this
policy applies, the person or organization legally
responsible for them. However, the animal or watercraft must be owned by you or a person included in
4.a. or 4.b. A person or organization using or having
custody of these animals or watercraft in the course
of a business, or withoul permission of the owner, is
not an insured; and

!
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d.

or carried on a vehicle included in 6.a. is not a motor
vehicle;

with respect to any vehicle to which this policy applies, any person while engaged in your employment
or the employment of a person included in 4.a. or 4.b.

c. a motorized golf cart. snowmobile, motorized bicycle,
motorized tricycle, all-terrain vehicle or any other
similar type equipment owned by an insured and
designed or used for recreational or utility purposes
off public roads, while off an insured location. A
motorized golf cart while used for golfing purposes is
not a motor vehicle; and

5. "insured location" means:
a.

the residence premises;

b.

the part of any other premises, other structures and
grounds used by you as a residence. This includes
premises, structures and grounds you acquire while
this policy is in effect for your use as a residence;

c.

d. any vehicle while being towed by or carried on a
vehicle inc/uded in 6.a., B.b. or S.c.

any premises used by you in connection with the
premises included in 5.a. or S.b.;

d.

any part of a premises not owned by an insured but
where an insured is temporarily res!ding;

e.

land owned by or rented to an insured on which a
one or two family dwelling is being constructed as a
residence for an insured;

f.

individual or family cemetery plots or burial vaults
owned by an insured;

g.

any part of a premises occasionally rented to an
insured for other than business purposes;

7. "occurrence", when used in Section II of this policy,
means an accident, including exposure to conditions.
which results in:

a. bodily injury; or
b. property damage;
during the policy period. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general conditions is considered to be
one occurrence.
8. "property damage" means physical damage to or destruction of tangible property, including loss of use of this
property. Theft or conversion of property by any insured
is not property damage.

h. vacant land owned by or rented to an insured. This
does not include farm land; and
i.

9. "residence employee" means an employee of an insured who performs duties. including househOld or domestic services, in connection with the maintenance or
use of the residence premises. This includes employees who perform similar duties elsewhere for you. This
does not include employees while performing duties in
connection with the business of an insured.

farm land (without buildings), rented or held for rental
to others, but not to exceed a total of SOO acres,
regardless of the number of locations.

6. "motor vehicle", when used in Section" of this policy,
means:

10. "residence premises" means:

a. a motorized land vehicle designed for travel on public
roads or subject to motor vehicle registration. A motorized land vehicle in dead storage on an insured
location is not a motor vehicle;

a. the one, two, three or four·family dwelling, other
structures and grounds; or
b. that part of any other building;

b. a trailer or sem.Hrailer designed for travel on public
roads and subject to motor vehicle registration. A
boat, camp, home or utility traiter not being towed by

where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations.
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loss is the direct and immediate cause of the collapse of
Ihe building.

increased at the same rate as the increase in the Inflation
Coverage Index shown in the Declarations.

This coverage does not increase the limit applying to the
damaged property.

To find the limits on a given date:

f

I

1. divide the Index on that date by the Index as of the
effective date of this Inflation Coverage provision; then

12. Locks. We will pay the reasonable expenses you incur
to re-key locks on exterior doors of the dwelling located
on the residence premises, when the keys to those
locks are a part of a covered theft loss.

2. multiply the resulting factor by the limits of liability for
Coverage A, Coverage B and Option 10 separately.
The limits of liability will not be reduced to less ,than the
amounts shown in the Declarations.

No deductible applies to this coverage.

If during the term of this policy the Coverage A limit of liability
is changed at your request, the effective date of this Inflation
Coverage provision is changed to coincide with the effective
date of such change.

INFLATION COVERAGE
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations for Coverage A, Coverage B and, when applicable, Option 10 will be

SECTION I - LOSSES INSURED
COVERAGE A - DWELLING

6. Vehicles, meaning impact by a vehicle.

We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property
described in Coverage A, except as provided in SECTION I·
LOSSES NOT INSURED.

7. Smoke. meaning sudden and accidental damage from
smoke.
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke from
agricultural smudging or industrial operations.

COVERAGE B • PERSONAL PROPERTY

8. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning only willful
and malicious damage to or destruction of property.

We insure for accidEmtal direct physical loss to property
described in Coverage B caused by the following perils,
except as provided in SECTION I· LOSSES NOT INSURED:

9. Theft, including attempted theft and loss of property from
a known location when it is probable that the property has
been stolen.

1. Fire or lightning.

2. Windstorm or hail. This peril does not include loss to

This peril does not include:

property contained in a building caused by rain, snow,
sleet, sand or dust. This limitation does not apply when
the direct force of wind or hail damages the building
causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain, snow,
sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening.

a. loss of a precious or semi-precious stone from its
setting;
b. loss caused by theft:

(1) committed by an Insured or by any other person
regularly residing on the insured location. Property of a student who is an insured is covered
while located at a residence away from home, if
the theft is committed by a person who is not an
insured;

This peril includes loss to watercraft of all types and their
trailers, furnishings, equipment, and outboard motors,
only while inside a fully enclosed building.
3. Explosion.

4. Riot or civil commotion.

(2) in or to a dwelling under construction or of materials and supplies for use in the construction until
the dwelling is completed and occupied; or

5. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and space-

craft.
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II

of any property (including land, structures, or im·
provements of any kind) whether on or off the residence premises; or
\!

b, defecl. weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness
in:
(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;

c. weather conditions.

(2) design, specifications, workmanship. construction, grading. compaction;

However, we do insure for any resulting loss from items
a., b. and c. unless the resulting loss is itself a Loss Not
Insured by this Section.

, (3) materials used in construction or repair; or

I

(4) maintenance;

I

SECTION I • LOSS SETTLEMENT

I

(4) we will not pay for increased costs resulting from
enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating
the construction, repair or demolition of a building
, or other structure, except as provided under Option OL - Building Ordinance or Law Coverage.

Only the Loss Settlement provisions shown in the Declarations apply. We will settle covered property losses according
to the following.
COVERAGE A - DWELLING
1. A1- Replacement Cost Loss Settlement·
Similar Construction.

b. Wood Fences: We will pay the actual cash value at
the time at loss tor loss or damage to wood fences,
not to exceed the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for COVERAGE A - DWELLING EXTENSION.

a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace with similar
construction and for the same use on the premises
shown in the Declarations. the damaged part of the
property covered under SECTION I- COVERAGES,
COVERAGE A • DWELLING, except for wood
fences, subject to ihe following:

I

I!
I
!

II
i
;

2. A2 • Replacement Cost Loss Settlement Common Construction.

I

!

I

(1) until actual repair or replacement is completed,
we will pay only the actual cash value at the time
of the loss of the damaged part of the property,
up to the applicable limit of liability shown in the
Declarations, not to exceed the cost to repair or
replace the damaged part of the property;

a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace with common
construction and for the same use 00 the premises
shown in the Declarations, the damaged part of the
property covered under SECTION I· COVERAGES, I(
COVERAGE A • DWELLING, except for wood ;
fences, subjecfto the following:

(2) when the repair or replacement is actuallY completed, we will pay the covered additional amount
you actually and necessarily spend to repair or
replace the damaged part of the property, or an
amount up to the applicable limit of liability shown
in the Declarations, whichever is less;

(1) we will pay only for repair or replacement of the \
damaged part of the property with common construction techniques and materials commonly !
used by the building trades in standard new
construction. We will not pay the cost to repair or
replace obsolete, antique or custom construction
with like kind and quality;

I
j

(3) to receive any additional payments on a replacement cost basis, you must complete the actual
repair or replacement of the damaged part of the
property within two years after the date of loss,
and notify us within 30 days after the work has
been completed; and

(2) until actual repair or replacement is completed,
we will pay only the actual cash value at the time
01 the loss of the damaged part of the property,
up to the applicable limit of liability shown in the
Declarations, not to exceed the cost to repair or
11
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10. Mortgage Clause. The word "mortgagee" includes trus-

4. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the amount of
loss. either one can demand that the amount of the loss
be set by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for
appraisal, each shall select a competent, disinterested
appraiser. Each shall notify the other of the appraiser's
Identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand.
The two appraisers shall then select a competent, impartial umpire. If the two appraisers are unable to agree upon
an umpire within 15 days, you or we can ask a judge of
a court of record in the state where the residence premises is located to select an umpire. The appraisers shall
then set the amount of the loss. If the appraisers submit
a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed
upon shall be the amount of the loss. If the appraisers fail
to agree within a reasonable time, they shall submit their
differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by
any two of these three shall set the amount of the loss.
Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting that
appraiser. Other expenses of the appraisal and the compensation of the umpire shall be paid equally by you and
us.

tee.
a. If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss
payable under Coverage A shall be paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more than one
mortgagee is named, the order of payment shall be
the same as the order of precedence of the mortgages.
b. If we deny your claim, that denial shall not <'pply to a
valid claim of the mortgagee. if the mortgagee:

(1) notifies us of any change in ownership, occupancy or substantial change in risk of which the
mortgagee is aware;
(2) pays on demand any premium due under this
policy, if you have not paid the premium; and
(3) submits a signed, sworn statement of loss within
60 days after receiving notice from us of your
failure to do so. Policy conditions relating to Appraisal, Suit Against Us and loss Payment apply
to the mortgagee.

5. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this policy is also
covered by other insurance, we will pay only our share of
the loss. Our share is the proportion of the loss that the
applicable limit under this policy bears to the total amount
of insurance covering the loss.

c. If this policy is cancelled by us, the mortgagee shall

6. Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought unless there
has been compliance with the policy provisions. The
action must be started within one year after the date of
loss or damage.

d. If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny
payment to you:

be notified at least 10 days before the date cancellation takes effect. Proof of mailing shall be proof of
notice.
.

(1) we are subrogated to all the rights of the mortgagee granted under the mortgage on the property;
or

7. Our Option. We may repair or replace any part of the
property damaged or stolen with similar property. Any
property we pay for or replace becomes our property.

(2) at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee the
whole principal on the mortgage plus any accrued
interest. In this event, we shall receive a full
aSSignment and transfer of the mortgage and all
securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt.

8. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you. We will
pay you unless some other person is named in the policy
or is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss wilt be
payable 60 days after we receive your proof of loss and:
a. reach agreement with you;

e. Subrogation shall not impair the right of the mortgagee to recover the full amount of the mortgagee's
claim.

b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or
c.

there is a filing of an appraisal award with us.

:-

iI
I

1-

>
)

11. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize an assignment or grant coverage for the benefit of a person or
organization holding, storing or transporting property for

9. Abandonment of Property. We need not accept any
property abandoned by an insured.
14
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under this policy for the purpose of obtaining insurance
benefits, then this policy is void and we will not pay you
or any other insured for this loss.

a fee, This applies regardless of any other provision of
this policy.
12. Intentional Acts. If you or any person insured under this
policy causes or procures a loss to property covered

SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGES
out of or in the course of the residence employee's
employment by an Insured.
.

COVERAGE L • PERSONAL LIABILITY
If aclaim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for

SECTION II· ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we
will:

We cover the following in addition to the limits of liability:
1. Claim Expenses. We pay:

1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which
the insured is legally liable; and

i
i
!
premiums on bonds required in suits we defend, but I

a. expenses we incur and costs taxed against an insured in suits we defend;

2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our
choice. We may make any investigation and settle any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation
to 'defend any claim Qr suit ends when the amount we pay
for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment
resulting from the occurrence. equals our limit of liability.

b.

not for bond amounts greater than the Coverage l
limit. We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any
bond;

II
I
I

c. reasonable expenses an insured incurs at our re- .
quest. This includes actual loss of earnings (but not
loss ofother income) up to $100 per day for aiding us
in the investigation or defense of claims or suits;

COVERAGE M· MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO OTHERS
We will pay the 'necessary medical expenses incurred or
medically ascertained within three years from the date of an
accident causing bodily injury. Medical expenses means
reasonable charges fOr medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance. hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices
and funeral services. This coverage applies only:

d. prejudgment interest awarded against the insured
on that part of the judgment we pay; and
,

'

,

I

e. interest on the entire judgment which accrues after
entry of the judgment and before we payor tender,
or deposit in court that part of the judgment which
does not exceed the limit of liability that applies.
l

1. to a person on the insured location with the permission
of an insured;
,

2. First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for first aid to I
others incurred by an insured for bodily injury covered 1
under this policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any
other insured.

2. to a person off the insured location, if the bodily injury:
a. arises out of a condition on the insured location or
the ways immediately adjoining;

I

b. is caused by the activities of an insured;

3. Damage to Property of Others.

c. is caused by a residence employee in the course of
the residence employee's employment by an insured; or

I

a. We will pay for property damage to property of ,
others caused by an insured.
I

b. We will not pay more than the smallest of the following I
amounts:
;

d. is caused by an animal owned by or in the care of an
insured; or

(1) replacement cost at the time of loss;

3. to a residence employee if the occurrence causing
bodily injury occurs off the insured location and arises

(2) full cost of repair; or
15
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3. Coverage M does not apply to bodily injury:

does not apply to property damage caused by fire,
smoke or explosion;

a. to a residence employee if it occurs off the insured
location and does not arise out of or in the course of
the residence employee's employment by an insured;

d. bodily injury to a person eligible to receive any
benefits required to be provided or voluntarily provided by an insured under a workers' compensation,
non·occupational disability, or occupational disease
law;

b. to a person eligible to receive any benefits required
to be provided or voluntarily provided under any
workers' compensation, non-occupational disability
or occupational disease law;

e. bodily injury or property damage for which an
insured under this policy is also an insured under a
nuclear energy liability policy or would be an insured
but for its termination upon exhaustion of its limit of
. liability. A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy
issued by Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters,
Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, or any of
their successors.

c. from nuclear reaction, radiation or radioactive contamination, all whether controlled or uncontrolled or
however caused, or any consequence of any of
these;
d. to a person other than a residence employee of an
insured, regularly residing on any part of the insured
location.

SECTION II « CONDITIONS
(3) names and addresses of any claimants and available witnesses;

1. Limit of Liability. The Coverage llimit is shown in the
Declarations. This is our limit for all damages from each
occurrence regardless of the number of Insureds,
claims made or persons injured.

b. immediately forward to us every notice, demand,
summons or other process relating to the accident or
occurrence;

The Coverage M limit is shown in the Declarations. This
is our limit for all medical expense for bodily injury to
one person as the result of one accident.

c. at our request, assist in:
(1) making settlement;

2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies separately to each insured. This condition shall not increase
our limit of liability for anyone occurrence.

(2) the enforcement of any right of contribution or
indemnity against a person or organization who
may be liable to an insured;

3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or occurrence,
the insured shall perform the following duties that apply.
You shall cooperate with us in seeing that these duties
are performed:

(3) the conduct of suits and attend hearings and
trials; and
(4) securing and giving evidence and obtaining the
attendance of witnesses;

a. give written notice to us or our agent as soon as
practicable. which sets forth:

d. under the coverage· Damage to Property of Others, exhibit the damaged property if within the insured's control; and

(1) the identity of this policy and insured;

e. the insured shall not, except at the insured's own
cost, voluntarily make payments, assume obligations
or incur expenses. This does not apply to expense
for first aid 10 others at the time of the bodily injury.

(2) reasonably available information on the time.
place and cirCUmstances of the accident or occurrence; and
18
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state Farm Fire and Casualty Company

RENEWAL CERllr.CATE

PO Box 5000
Dupont, WA 98327-5000

frP,...O_L_IC_Y_N_U_M_B...
ER.",..,-:-:-_12_-_B_X._1_4_16_-_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Homeowners pOlicy
JUL 08 2006 to JUL 08 2007

~_i _

M-15- 1327-F495 F H

TO BE PAID BY MORTGAGEE

LINFORD, D RICHARD & LINDSEY
2241 E GOSSAMER LN
BOISE ID 83106-6141

1I1,1",11.lmll 1111111111111111111,11,11111 t.l1,I",III,I,,1

Coverages and limits
Section I
A Dwelling
Dwelling Extension
B Personal Property
C Loss of Use

f

t

I
j

II
I

i
Up To

I

$292,000
29,200
219,000
Actual Loss
Sustained

-I

1,000

I
I
I

Deductibles - Section I
All Losses

-i
t

i
Location: Same as Mailing Address

Section II
L Personal Liability
Damage to Property of Others
M Medical Payments to Others
(Each Person)

Loss Settlement Provisions (See Polley)
A 1 Replacement Cost - Similar Construction
B1 Limited Replacement Cost· Coverage B

Forms, Options, and Endorsements
Homeowners Policy
Jewelry and Furs $2,5001$5,000
Increase Dwlg up to $58 400
OrdinancelLaw 10%1 $29,200
Amendatory Endorsement
Policy Endorsement
Fungus (Including Mold) Excl
Back-Up DwelllListed Property
Motor Vehicle Endorsement

$300,000
500
1,000

FP-79S5

OPT JF
OPT 10
OPT OL

FE-7212.S
FE-S320
FE-5398
FE-S70G.l
FE-5452

$628.00

Annual Premium

Premium Reductions
Home/Auto Discount
Claim Free Discount

Inflation Coverage Index:

93.00
155.00

182.1

This policy does not provide earthquake coverage. If you are interested in obtaining earthquake coverage,
please contact your State Farm agent for more information concerning the coverage and eligibility
criteria.

SFF-UN 01570

TkIsp.~(4f~~. lue~~(bJc ~~~.
8450

N

1V,E9,G2

4011

I

Agent ANGELA ~ea 'INs AGENCY INC

TAIAnhnnA (:;>08) ~4:>.77:>R

If you have mc+:alease contact your agent.
See reverse side for important information.
REP

Prepared MAY 24 2006
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I
II

CONTINUED FROM FRONT

Mortgagee:
2nd Mtg:

SFF-LIN 01571

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION
Loan No: 0024191983
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION
Loan No: 0024191991

Your coverage amount...
It is up to you to choose the coverages and limits that meet your needs. We recommend that you purchase a ooverage limit
equal to the estimated replacement cost of your home. Replacement cost estimates are available from building contractors and
replacement cost appraisers, or, your agent can provide an estimate from Xaotware, Inc~ using information you provide about
your home. We can accept the type of estimate you ohoose as long as it provides a reasonable level of detail about your home.
8
State Farm does not guarantee that any estimate will be the actual future oost to rebuild your home. Higher limits are available
at higher premiums. Lower limits are also available, which if selected may make certain coverages unavailable to you. We
encourage you to periodically review your coverages and limits with your agent and to notify us of any changes or additions to
your home.
Discounts and Rating· The longer you are insured with State Farm~ and the fewer claims you have, the lower your premium.
For policyholders insured by State Farm for three or more years, the Claim Free Discount Plan provides a premium discount if
you have not had any claims considered for the Plan in the most recent three-year period since becoming insured with State
Farm. Premium adjustments under the Claim Record Rating Plan are based on the number of years you have been insured with
State Farm and on the number of claims that we consider for the Plan. Depending on the Plan(s) that applies in your
state/province, claims considered for the Plans generally include claims resulting in a paid loss and may include weather-related
claims. Additionally, depending on your state/province's plan and your tenure with State Farm, any olaims with your prior insurer
resulting in property damage or injury may also influenoe your premium. For further information about whether a Claim Free
Discount is in effect in your state/province, the Claim Record Rating Plan that applies in your state/province, and the claims we
consider for the Plans, please contact your State Farm agent.

NonCE TO POUCYHOLDER:
For a comprehensive description of coverages and forms, please refer to your policy.
Policy changes requested before the "Date Prepared", which appear on this notice, are effective on the Renewal Date of this
policy unless otherwise indicated by a separate endorsement, binder, or amended declarations. Any coverage forms attached
to this notice are also effective on the Renewal Date of this policy.
Policy changes requested after the "Date Prepared" will be sent to you as an amended declarations or as an endorsement to
your policy. Billing for any additional premium for such changes will be mailed at a later date.
If, during the past year, you've acquired any valuable property items, made any improvements to insured property, or have any
questions about your insurance coverage, contact your State Farm agent.
Please keep this with your polioy.
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.. . . . ;_ELAM&BURKE=:::::::::: . ::.
ATTORNEYS AT tAW

JAMES D. LaRUE
251

En~t

I:ront Slreet, Suite. 300

Post Olliec Box 1539
Boise, Idrlho 83701
Tdcphont' 208 343-5454
Fax 208 384·5844
E-mail Jdl@cll1ll1burkc.com

June 2,2010

Neil. D. McFee ley
EBERLE, .I3E~LIN, KADING, TURNl30W
& MCKL.VEEN,O·IARTERED

Illl West JeffersonStl'eet. Suite530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701

l~e::

:s' fire;v. Lin/bNI V..SteNe fi'(/tifl Fir'!
E&B NQ. 1-1.267
i)Q)Ii'/:

lll~

purpose of this. letter is .toconfirm an agreementbetweeJi D. Rich~ll'(lal)d l.il1dscy
Linfon:l ("inSlJl'eds") and State Farm Fire and GasualtyColnpany(,LStale. Fatmi)coHe¢tively
C'the parties") r~gardi'ng the insuredsl ' claims that Slate Farm has not paid the anlQuntQf loss
claimed under Coverage A oftheir Homeowners polic:y.,PoIicy NQ. 12':BX-7416'-6, ("(he
Policy") relating to the fii'e loss of J'8I1uary .17, 2001 ~ at 2241E. Gossal11erLn., B()ise,Jdaho:.
ft is my understanding that the insureds claimed benefits tll1derCoverag~ A (Dwelling),
Coverage n (Personal Pl\jp~tty) anJ C(/vcI:agc C (Loss ofU::,e). h is also myt:nJerstulldfllg. that

there are no disputes between the insureds and Stale FarJ11l'egarding payments made by State
Farm under Coverages Band C. It is tluther my understanding lhat the insureds bave received
payment ~lOder Coverage A in the amount of $197,065.67. The insureds entered into two
contracts with Dave's Inc.: one contract tor repC!ir of the fire damag.c, and another contract tor
remodel of the dwelling. A dispute has arisen between Dave's Inc. nnd the insureds which
resulted in a lawsuit being tiled. by Dave's Inc. 011 behalf of the insureds, your I1rm filed a thil'dparty complhint against State Farlll.
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, by letter dated May 7, 2010, on behal f of State Farm,
I demanded that the amount of the loss under Covcmgc A be set/det~\,ll1ined by appraisal. The
insureds have elected not to appoirlt a separate appraiscl', but havc agJ'ecd:to modit)1 Section I .'
Conditions, paragraph 4 - Appraisal - to the following terms:

EXHIBIT B
OO(]Ufiibit A

Neil D. ,McFeeley
Jlili·e··2;~·2U·1··n::~:::·~::::::,:··'··:·'~::··~~::~::~::.:'::~::::.:

Page 2
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. . . .:.--

__ _--..

- the parties agree to resolve and set thcal110unt of loss lmdel' Coverage A of the Policy
by appraisal;
- the padies,will jOintly appoint Mike .Bel'kson as their appraisel';
-the. illsuredsalld State Farm will be allowed to pl'Ovicle Mr. Berkson. documeJits and
information fOl' his cOllsi(feratioll.;
- sho~t1d MI', Be.tks(Hlhav¢ questions 9r require additional.intbrmatiOll, he should shl,ll'e
stI,ch inquideswith both l?l.lrties~
- the il1$llredswill alloW Mr, Berl<~on accessto the. insured d'wellrt1g~ifl:cq(les~ed~ft)r
purp(Jses Vf p~rtonHing his appraisal;
- Mr,. Berk~()n will determine the cost. to I-epail' damagestQ the dweHiilg, ca\l.s~d by the,
fil'e,.as ifhe WaS a contractoronthedateofioss(amouilt oflqss);,
- Mr. Berkson wiH provide' a wdttenapprnisal oftil,eal1)()tllH of loss. to the insureds and
State Faml;'
.~ the parties agtee tQ be hound by the wri,tten apPJ~nisuf;~nd
.. State Ful'm will pay Mr, B¢rksQllte,¢S, fll1dexpenscs tlS t.he parties' joint appraiser,
Theirjsur~dSijrl<J State Farlli ?lgrc~ to
complnint 1I1llilthcappI'ohmi is c()ll1pl~tedi

SlUyauy f1.1I;ther proceedings on the

thil'd~ptll'ty

If yOli tlgl'ee,JQ II)\! above~ kindly indfcateby signing andrettltlling the original of thil:!
I¢tlet~ Ol'r b¢hnllpfyoul'cnel1ts~
..
.
Very tnily YOlU'S,

ELAM&.. BURKE.
A Pi'()lessiO/wl Associaiion

~~~
James D,. LaRlie:

JDL:sd

~~dfl('·
N~il

ii M{;fccl~y-'-- --------

.-

Attorney for D. Richard and Lindsey LiMOI'd
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AffIrmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

William KANE and Dorothy Kane, his wife, William
Mellinger, Noel Weiss, Michael Foster and Merrilee
Foster, his wife, Keith McCall, Epiphaniana Beckham,
AdnanJaffar, Michael Raffaele and Margaret Muller,
Vincent Carcia and Christine Carcia, his wife, James
Miller and Elizabeth Miller, His Wife, on their own
behalf and as representatives of similarly situated
persons, Appellants,

v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
Allstate Insurance Company, Metropolitan Property and
Casualty Insurance Company, Ace American Insurance
Company, Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company,
Markel American Insurance Company, One Beacon
Insurance d/b/a Pennsylvania General Insurance
Company, Keystone Insurance Company and Erie
Insurance Company, Appellees.
Argued May 22, 2003.
Filed Dec. 22, 2003.
Reargument Denied March 3, 2004.
Background: Insureds brought class action against
homeowners' insurers to recover for breach of contract and
bad-faith failure to pay replacement cost for partial losses
to dwellings before the property was repaired or replaced.
The Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County, Civil
Division, No. 01005040-16-1,Kane,J., sustained insurers'
objections in nature of demurrer. Insureds appealed.
Holdings: The Superior Court, No. 237 EDA 2003,Todd,
J., held that:

ill term "actual cash value" in some of the policies could
not mean replacement value without a deduction for
depreciation, and
ill a policy with a dwelling replacement cost guarantee
endorsement entitled insured to replacement cost without
deduction for depreciation before repairing or replacing
the property.

Graci, J., filed a concurring and dissenting statement.
West Headnotes

ill Appeal and Error 30 ~863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature
of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Review of an order sustaining preliminary objections
is plenary.

I1.l Appeal and Error 30 ~863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature
of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 ~917(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k915 Pleading
30k917 Demurrers
30k917(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
--The Superior Court will sustain a demurrer only if,
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assuming the material facts pled in the complaint to be
true, plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable
cause of action.

I.2l Insurance 217 <C:=>1809
217 Insurance

ill Pleading 302 <C:=>216(1)
302 Pleading
302V Demurrer or Exception
302k216 Scope of Inquiry and Matters Considered
on Demurrer in General
302k216(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
When considering the grant of preliminary 0 bjections
in the nature of a demurrer, the Superior Court must
resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no
testimony or other evidence outside the complaint may be
considered.

217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k 1809 k. Construction or Enforcement as
Written. Most Cited Cases
Where the language of the insurance policy is clear
and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that
language.

III Insurance 217 <C:=>1832(1)
2 I 7 Insurance

ill Insurance 217 <C:=>1822

217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k 1830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries;
Disfavoring Insurers
217k1832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or
Conflict
2l7k 1832( 1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Where a provision of an insurance policy is
ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor
of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the
agreement.

217 Insurance

00 Insurance 217 <C:=>1808

217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k1822 k. Plain, Ordinary or Popular Sense
of Language. Most Cited Cases

217 Insurance

HI Pleading 302 <C:=>218(1)
302 Pleading
302V Demurrer or Exception
302k218 Hearing and Determination on Demurrer
302k218( 1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Any doubt l1S to the legal sufficiency of the complaint
should be resolved in favor of overruling demurrer.

Insurance 217 <C:=>1855
217 Insurance
2 I 7XIII Contracts and Po licies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k 1855 k. Dictionaries. Most Cited Cases
Words of common usage in an insurance policy are to
be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense,
and courts may inform their understanding of these terms
by considering their dictionary definitions.

217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217kl808 k. Ambiguity in General. Most Cited
Cases
While a court will not distort the meaning of
insurance policy language or resort to a strained
contrivance in order to find an ambiguity, it must find that
contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to
a particular set of facts.

f2l Insurance 217 <C:=>2177

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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217 Insurance

I.!1l Insurance 217 ~2172

217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2173 Amount of Damage or Loss
217k2177 k. Partial Loss. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217 ~2181

217 Insurance

217 Insurance
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2180 Valuation
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
In partial loss situations, in the absence of clear
language to the contrary, a property insurer may not
deduct depreciation from the replacement cost to arrive at
actual cash value; rather, "actual cash value" is
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation,
where such deduction would thwart the insured's
expectation to be made whole.

I1.ill Insurance 217 ~2181
217 Insurance
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2180 Valuation
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Where qualifying language is absent and an insured is
promised "actual cash value," the insured is entitled to the
cost to repair or replace the damaged property without a
depreciation deduction.

217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2167 Amount of Insurance
217k2172 k. Replacement. Most Cited
Cases
Insurance 217 ~2181
217 Insurance
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2180 Valuation
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The term "actual cash value" in homeowners'
insurance policies could not mean replacement value
without a deduction for depreciation; the policies entitled
the insureds to actual cash value if they did not repair or
replace the damage, stated that payment of actual cash
value "may" include a deduction for depreciation, and
unambiguously allowed the insurers to deduct depreciation
until repair or replacement was made.
WUInsurance 217 ~2172

217 Insurance

I.lll Courts 106 ~92

217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2167 Amount of Insurance
217k2 I 72 k. Replacement. Most Cited
Cases
Insurance 217 ~2181

106 Courts

217 Insurance

10611 Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106I1(G) Rules of Decision
106k88 Previous Decisions as Controlling or as
Precedents
106k92 k. Dicta. Most Cited Cases
Repetition does not elevate assertions that are
otherwise dictum into binding precedent.

217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2180 Valuation
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The term "actual cash value" in homeowners'
insurance policies could not mean replacement value
without a deduction for depreciation; although the policies
did not define "actual cash value," they required payment

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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of actual cash value until or unless repair or replacement
was made.

[HJ. Insurance 217 ~2172
217 Insurance
217XVI Co verage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2167 Amount of Insurance
217k2172 k. Replacement. Most Cited
Cases
Homeowners' insurance policy entitled insured to
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation
before repairing or replacing partial loss to dwelling;
although the policy limited payment to actual cash value
until completion of repair or replacement, the dwelling
replacement cost guarantee endorsement required payment
of replacement cost without deduction for depreciation,
the definition of "actual cash value" as including a
depreciation deduction was in a section of the policy
applicable to losses other than damage to dwelling, and
the interrelation between the primary policy language and
the endorsement language resulted in an ambiguity.
*1040 Jonathan Wheeler, Philadelphia and Joseph A.
Zenstein, Jenkintown, for appellants.
Mark J. Levin, Philadelphia, for Allstate.
Moira C. Duggan, Philadelphia, for Keystone Insurance.
Before: TODD, GRACI, and T AMILIA, 11.
TODD,J.
Cj[ 1 In this class action,lli.!. Appellants, who are home
owner's insurance policy holders and who have sued on
their own behalf and as representatives of classes of
similarly situated persons, ask us to review the order
entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas
sustaining the preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer filed by the Appellee insurers. We affIrm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
FNt. Although this litigation was commenced as
a class action, it has not been certified. Under

Rule 1707 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, class action certification is not
determined until after the pleadings are closed.
As this appeal is before us following the grant of
preliminary objections, the pleadings have not
closed, and so class certification has not yet been
determined below.
Cj[ 2 As this appeal comes to us following the
sustaining of preliminary objections against Appellants,
the following background is gleaned from Appellants'
amended complaint.ft!l Appellants have "replacement
cost" home owner's insurance policies, separately and
variously, with Appellees State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company ("State Farm"), Allstate Insurance Company
("Allstate"), Metropolitan Property and Casualty
Insurance Company ("Metropolitan"), Ace American
Insurance Company ("Ace American"), Ace Fire
Underwriters Insurance Company ("Ace Fire"), Markel
American Insurance Company ("Markel"), One Beacon
Insurance d/b/a Pennsylvania General Insurance Company
("One Beacon"), Keystone Insurance Company
("Keystone"), and Erie Insurance Company ("Erie"). Each
of Appellants have suffered partial physical losses to
buildings covered under their respective policies.

FN2. The original complaint filed on August 3,
2001 identified 31 separate plaintiff-insureds and
28 separate defendant-insurers. Following a court
conference, the insurers supplied the insureds
with copies of the applicable insurance policies.
After reviewing the policies and concluding that
19 of the policies contained unobjectionable
language and that the case should be
discontinued as to those issuing insurers, an
amended complaint was filed alleging causes of
action by the present Appellants (10 insureds)
and the present Appellees (9 insurers).
Cj[ 3 At the core of this present dispute is the meaning
of the phrase "actual cash value," as used and, to varying
degrees, defined in the replacement cost policies at issue.
Appellants assert that they have not received full
indemnification under their insurance policies with
Appellees for their partial losses because Appellees have
deducted depreciation from the actual cost to repair or
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replace the damaged portion of their buildings. Appellants
contend that, under Pennsylvania law, unless the phrase
"actual cash value" is specifically defined in an insurance
policy to include depreciation, depreciation is not to be
included, and a policy holder is entitled to
repair/replacement cost. They assert that the definition of
"actual cash value" in the policies issued by Appellees
lacks the necessary*1041 specificity, and that, as a result,
Appellees breached their contracts with Appellants by
failing to proffer repair/replacement costs.
14 Appellees, on the other hand, assert that the issue
is one of timing: they do not dispute Appellants'
entitlement to replacement cost coverage, but, rather,
assert that the policies specify that Appellants must first
undertake to repair or replace the damaged property
before being fully compensated. Until the damage is
repaired or replaced, Appellees assert that, given the
definition and usage of the phrase "actual cash value" in
the respective policies, Appellants are entitled only to
repair/replacement cost minus depreciation.

I 5 Challenging Appellees' practice of deducting
depreciation from Appellants' loss settlements, Appellants
brought suit alleging breach of contract, insurance bad
faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, and violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S. § 20 I-I et seq. As noted, Appellants
brought this suit as a class action, on their own behalf and
as representatives of classes of similarly situated persons
in Pennsylvania.
16 FollowingthefilingofAppellants'amended complaint.
Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer to each of Appellants' causes of action, asserting,
inter alia, that given the language of the policies at issue,
Appellants had failed to allege a breach of contract.
17 On November 18, 2002, the trial court granted the
preliminary objections, finding that under the policy
language and Pennsylvania caselaw, Appellants had failed
to allege claims for breach of contract. The court rejected
Appellants' arguments that the phrase "actual cash value"
could never include depreciation under Pennsylvania law,
and that, as used and defined in their respective policies,
the phrase did not include depreciation. Thus, the court

concluded that under the policies, Appellees were not
required, in the first instance, to proffer repair or
replacement costs without depreciation. For related
reasons, the trial court found that Appellants had failed to
allege claims for bad faith and a violation of the UTPCPL.
Accordingly, the court dismissed Appellants' amended
complaint. (Trial Court Order, 12118/02.)
18 Appellants appealed this determination, and now
ask: "Is an insurance company permitted to withhold
depreciation from a policyholder's actual cash value
payment from partial losses where the phrase 'actual cash
value' is not defined in the insurance policy or where the
insurance policy states that there may be a deduction for
depreciation when determining actual cash value?"
(Appellants' Brief at 3.)
[1][2](3][4]1 9 Our review of an order sustaining
preliminary objections is plenary. Sunbeam Corp. v.
Libertv Mut. Ins. Co., 740 A.2d 1179, 1183
(Pa.Super.1999). We will sustain the demurrer only if,
assuming the material facts pled in the complaint to be
true, "plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable
cause of action." Id. When considering the grant of
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, this
Court must "resolve the issues solely on the basis of the
pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside the
complaint may be considered." Mellon Bank. N.A. v.
Fabinvi. 437 Pa.Super. 559, 567-68, 650 A.2d 895, 899
(994) (citation omitted). Any doubt as to the legal
sufficiency ofthe complaint should be resolved in favor of
overruling the demurrer. 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia
Electric Co .. 437 Pa.Super. 650, 654, 650 A.2d 1094,
1096 (1994).
*1042110 Further, to support a claim for breach of
contract, "a plaintiff must plead: 1) the existence of a
contract, including its essential terms; 2) a breach of a
duty imposed by the contract; and 3) resultant damage."
Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066,
1070 (Pa.Super.2003). There is no dispute in this case that
elements one and three have been pled sufficiently. At
issue, therefore, is whether Appellants have pled
sufficiently a duty on the part of Appellees.
III Whether a contract imposes a duty is a matter of
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contract interpretation. In turn, interpretation of an
insurance contract is a matter of law. Madison Const. Co.
v. Harleysville MUI.Ins. Co .. 557 Pa, 595,606,735 A.2d
100, 106 (1999). Our standard of review, therefore, is
plenary. Young V. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States. 350 Pa.Super. 247,252,504 A.2d 339, 341
(1986). In interpreting the language of an insurance
policy, the goal is "to ascertain the intent of the parties as
manifested by the language of the written instrument." See
Madison, 557 Pa, at 606, 735 A.2d at 106. Indeed, our
Supreme Court has instructed that the "polestar of our
inquiry ... is the language of the insurance policy." Id.
[5J[ 6][7] [8] <][ 12 Furthermore, when construing a policy,
"[ w]ords of common usage ... are to be construed in their
natural, plain and ordinary sense ... and we may inform
our understanding of these terms by considering their
dictionary definitions;" where "the language of the
[policy] is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to
give effect to that language." !d. at 606-608. 735 A.2d at
106-108 (citations omitted). However, "[w]here a
provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is
to be construed in favor of the insured and against the
insurer, the drafter of the agreement." Id. at 606, 735 A.2d
at 106. Thus, while a court will not "distort the meaning of
the language or resort to a strained contrivance in order to
find an ambiguity", it must find that "contractual terms are
ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation when applied to a particular set offacts." Id.

the following:
(1) until actual repair or replacement is completed, we
will pay only the actual cash value at the time of the
loss of the damaged part of the property ... ;
(2) when the repair or the replacement is actually
completed, we will pay the covered additional amount
you actually and necessarily spend to repair or
replace the damaged part of the property ... ;
(State Farm Policy, at 11 (RR 35a).) The Keystone
and Ace American policies provide as follows:
(4) [W]e will pay no more than the actual cash value of
the damage unless:
*1043 (a) actual repair or replacement is complete; or
(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage is both:
(i) less than 5% of the amount of insurance in this
policy on the building; and

(ii) less than [$2500 in ACE American; $1000 in
Keystone].
(Keystone Policy, Endorsement HO-3, at 10-11 (RR
73a-74a); Ace American Policy, at 7 (RR 54a).) Finally,
the One Beacon policy provides:

<][ 13 We begin by reviewing the relevant language of
the policies at issue. Each of the policies is a replacement
cost policy, but each, Appellees assert, requires the
insured first to endeavor to repair or replace damage
before full replacement costs will be proffered. The
policies refer to "actual cash value" as the compensation
that will be provided until repairs are completed, and, to
varying degrees, the policies define "actual cash value" as
including a deduction for depreciation. In order to
facilitate our analysis of these policies, we break them into
three groups. In the first group, comprised of the State
Farm, Keystone, Ace American, and One Beacon policies,
the policies are silent as to the definition of "actual cash
value." In relevant part, the State Farm policy provides:

(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash value of
the damage until actual repair or replacement is
complete. Once actual repair or replacement is
complete, we will settle the loss according to the
provisions of b.(l) and b. (2) above [which pay the
replacement cost "without deduction for depreciation"
of the part of the building damaged].
However, if the cost to repair or replace the damage
is both:

a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace ... subject to

we will settle the loss according to the provisions of

(a) less than 5% of the amount of the insurance in this
policy on the building; and
(b) less than $2500,
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b.(l) and (b).2 above whether or not actual repair or
replacement is complete.
(One Beacon Policy, at 8 (RR 66a).)
«J[ 14 In the second group, comprised of the Allstate,
Metropolitan, Ace Fire, and Markel policies, the policies
explicitly refer to depreciation as a deduction from "actual
cash value." The Allstate policy provides as follows:

b) Actual Cash Value. If you do not repair or replace the
damaged, destroyed or stolen property, payment will be
on an actual cash value basis. This means there may be
a deduction for depreciation....
You may make claim for additional payment as
described in paragraph c, and paragraph d if
applicable, if you repair or replace the damaged,
destroyed or stolen covered property within 180 days
of the actual cash value payment.
(Allstate Policy, at 17 (RR 39a).) The Metropolitan
policy provides:

policy provides as follows:
d) if "you" repair or replace the damaged property for
the same use and on the same or contiguous site, "we"
will pay the amount actually and necessarily spent to
repair or replace such property to a condition and
appearance*1044 similar to that which existed at the
time of the loss.

***
e) If "you" decide not to repair or replace under
paragraph d) above, the settlement will be made
according to Actual Cash Value. This means there may
be a deduction for depreciation.
(Markel Policy, Endorsement ML-255 (RR 63a).)
«J[ 15 We place the remaining policy, the Erie policy,
in its own category, as the interrelation of the primary
policy language and the endorsement is more complicated,
and affects the interpretation and meaning of "actual cash
value". The Erie policy states, in the main body:

(8) LOSS SETTLEMENT
b. [W]e will not pay more than the actual cash value
of the damage to the structure until actual repair or
replacement is complete. You may make a further
claim within 180 days after the loss, provided you
stilI have an insurable interest in the property, for any
additional liability based on the replacement cost
value at the time of the loss.
Actual cash value means there may be a deduction for
depreciation.

The following types of losses will be settled on an
actual cash value basis. This means that we will deduct
for depreciation.
Losses to:
• property insured under Personal Property Coverage
• structures that are not buildings or carports

(Metropolitan Policy, Endorsement H303, at 2 (RR
50a).) The Ace Fire policy provides:
You can make a claim for loss or damage to a building
based solely on the replacement cost of the damage less
depreciation. If you then repair or rep lace the damaged
property and the amount you received does not cover
your loss, you may make a claim for the rest of your loss
based on the replacement cost basis. The claim must be
made, however, within 180 days from the date of the
loss.
(Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 57a).) Finally, the Markel

• carpeting
• household appliances
• cloth awnings
• outdoor antennas and outdoor equipment, whether
or not attached to buildings
• insured buildings and structures which do not meet
the requirements for a replacement cost settlement
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described below.
The actual cash value will be determined at the time of
the loss. Payment will not exceed the amount necessary
to repair or replace the damaged property.
Dwelling and Other Structures Coverage
Loss under Dwelling Coverage or Other Structures
Coverage will be settled by one of the following
methods:
1. REPLACEMENT COST SETTLEMENT
(meaning we will not deduct for depreciation):

replacement cost basis, without deduction for
depreciation. Payment will not exceed the smallest of
the following amounts:
- the replacement cost of that part of the dwelling
damaged for equivalent construction and use on the
same premises;
*1045 - the amount actually and necessarily spent to
repair or replace the damaged dwelling.
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE POllCY
APPLY.
(Erie Policy Dwelling Replacement Cost Guarantee
Endorsement HP-BK (RR 159a).).!:m

***
2. LESS THAN FULL REPLACEMENT COST
SETTLEMENT
Iffull replacement cost settlement does not apply, we
will pay the larger of the following amounts, but not
exceeding the amount of insurance under this policy
applying to the building:
a. the actual cash value of that part of the building
damaged; or

***
We will pay no more than actual cash value of the
damage until the actual repair or replacement is
completed....
You may disregard the replacement cost provision and
make claim for loss or damage to buildings on an actual
cash value basis.
You have the right to make claim, within 180 days after
the loss, for any additional amounts we will be required
to pay under this Loss Settlement provision.
(Erie Policy, at 11 (RR I58a).) The Erie
endorsement adds the following language, in relevant part:
8. Loss Settlement
2. Under Dwelling Coverage loss will be settled on a

FN3. This endorsement was omitted from
Appellants' amended complaint but attached to
Erie's preliminary objections.
<J[ 16 We now turn to a review of the meaning of the
phrase "actual cash value" because, as we have noted, the
usage and meaning of this phrase is at the heart of the
present dispute. Analysis of the phrase has a long history
in the courts of this Commonwealth. In Fedas v. Insurance
Co. ofthe State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pat 555, 151 A. 285
(1930), our Supreme Court first comprehensively
addressed the meaning of this phrase in an insurance
policy. In Fedas, the Court considered whether an insurer
could deduct depreciation in the event of a partial loss
under a fire insurance policy. The policy allowed
compensation for "[a]ctual cash value (ascertained with
proper deductions for depreciation) on the property at the
time of loss or damage, but not exceeding the amount
which it would cost to repair or replace the same with
materials of like kind and quality within a reasonable time
after such loss or damage." /d. at 561, 151 A. at 287. The
Court stated that "in ascertaining the loss resulting from
the partial burning of a building, the true result is to be
reached by taking the cost of reconstruction according to
the conditions existing and lawfully imposed at the time
when the fire occurred." Id. The Court explained that
"actual cash value" was not the same as market value,
which would incorporate depreciation, but rather was akin
to replacement cost:
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Generally speaking, 'actual cash value' does not mean
market value, as the term is understood. 'Market value,'
as here urged, embidies [sic] what a purchaser willing to
buy feels justified in paying for property which one is
willing but not required to sell. 'Market value' includes
factors of time, place, circumstance, use, and benefit;
depreciation is included, but one figure is the result of
these considerations, the price to be paid. Ordinarily
actual cash value has no relation to any of these factors;
it is value under all times, such as the cost of
manufacturing or building or book value. The policy
intended something different from market value; the
latter includes 'depreciation,' while the 'actual cash
value' of the policy is to be diminished by
'depreciation.' Actual cash value in a policy of
insurance means what it would cost to replace a
building or a chattel as of the date of the fire.
Where a building is entirely destroyed, the application
of the rule is simple; where a building is partically [sic]
destroyed, it may be difficult to arrive at actual cash
value, less depreciation if it is to be considered; but
difficulties cannot prevent the right to compensation.
There enters into actual cash value of the part
destroyed the fact that it was a part of an entire
property and the use made of it. It is summed up in the
idea 'the cost of replacing in as nearly as possible the
condition as it existed at the date of the fire. '
[d. at 562-63, 151 A. at 288 (emphasis added). The
Court concluded that, regardless of the reference to
depreciation deductions, the insured was entitled to
replacement cost, as this was the only recompense*1046
that could make the insured whole under the
circumstances:

The actual cost of new material, with deduction for
depreciation, which is not sufficient to replace the
building as nearly as it could be as of the date of the
fire, does not comply with the policy, which was to
insure against loss not exceeding the amount named in
the insurance.
." The result reached is that called for in the
policy-replacement as nearly as possible, or its cost. If
part of the building destroyed cannot be replaced with

material of like kind and quality, then it should be
substantially duplicated within the meaning of the
policy.
.. , To sum up, 'actual cash value' means the actual
value expressed in terms of money of the thing for the
purpose for which it was used; in other words, the real
value to replace. The rule established by our decisions
seeks a result which will enable the parties to restore the
property to as near the same condition as it was at the
time of the fire, or pay for it is [sic] cash; that was the
loss insured against.. ..

[d. at 563-64, 151 A. at 288. Thus, under Fedas,
where an insured suffers a partial loss and is promised
"actual cash value," he is entitled to replacement cost,
without deduction for depreciation.
1{ 17 In Farberv. PerkiomenMut.lns. Co., 370Pa.480,
88 A.2d 776 (1952), the Supreme Court again addressed
the propriety of depreciation deductions with regard to a
partial loss under a fire insurance policy. With language
similar to that in Fedas, the policy at issue in Farber
insured against loss "to the extent of the actual cash value
of the property at the time of the loss, but not exceeding
the amount which it would cost to repair or replace the
property with material of like kind and quality within a
reasonable time after such loss." [d. at 486, 88 A.2d at
779. The insured suffered a partial loss and, while the cost
of labor and materials necessary to restore the building
was more than the policy limit, the depreciated value was
less than the limit, and the insurer offered only the
depreciated value. The Court concluded that, under Fedas
and other decisions of the Court, the insured was entitled
to full replacement cost (up to the policy limit), without
deduction for depreciation. [d. at 486, 88 A.2d at 779.
Indeed, the Court added that, in the absence of a change
by the insurers to their policies, no other result was
allowable:

The legal meaning of ["actual cash value"] having been
determined and established by prior decisions of this
court, we cannot now depart therefrom without
impairing the obligation of the contracts as written. Nor
is there any legally meritorious basis for suggesting the
necessity for a change in the interpretation of the
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contracts. The defendant companies prepare their own
policy forms and presumably exclude therefrom
anything for which they desire not to assume liability.
Moreover, insurance companies are, of course,
conversant with the germane court decisions .... Any
change in the defendants' policies in order to avoid in
the future the impact of our prior decisions is for them
to ponder. What they presently seek cannot justly be
accorded by court decision.
Id. at 486-87, 88 A.2d at 779. Thus, where a policy
promises "actual cash value," the insured is entitled to
replacement cost. See also Judge v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co.,
303 Pa.Super. 221, 227-228, 449 A.2d 658, 661 (1982)
(quoting with approval the language from Fedas that
"[a]ctual cash value in a policy of insurance means what
it would cost to replace a building or a chattel as of the
date of the fIre.")
*10471[ 18 The signifIcance of the fInal admonition
in Farber was apparent in this Court's decision in London
v. Illsurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania, 703
A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.1997) (en bane ). There, the Court
addressed whether the Insurance Placement Facility of
Pennsylvania, which offered fIre insurance policies under
the Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act,E!:l± should be permitted to
depreciate the cost of repairing a building partially
destroyed by fIre. The policy in question compensated for
losses "to the extent of the actual cash value of the
property at the time of loss, but not exceeding the amount
which it would cost to repair or replace the property." Id.
at 47 (emphasis omitted). The phrase "actual cash value"
was defIned in the policy as "the cost to repair or replace
the damaged property less deductions for physical
deterioration (depreciation) and obsolescence." Id.
(emphasis omitted). The insureds asserted that
Pennsylvania caselaw prohibited the insurers from
deducting depreciation in a partial loss situation under a
standard fIre policy. While admitting that the insureds
"may be correct," id. at 48, the Court rejected their
contention that a Fair Plan Act policy was the equivalent
of a standard fIre policy. Id. at 48-49. Moreover, the Court
held that the insurers had responded to the invitation of the
Supreme Court in Farber, supra, to tailor their policies
and clarify their coverage:

FN4. 40 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1600.101-.502. As a
response to urban riots in the 1960s, the Fair
Plan Act "requires each insurer that writes
property insurance in this Commonwealth to
participate in providing insurance for high-risk
property for which insurance is not normally
available." London, 703 A.2d at 48.
The Farber decision arguably prevents insurance
companies from deducting depreciation in the event of
a partial loss that does not exceed the depreciated value
of the whole property. If the companies wanted to avoid
such a result, the court plainly suggested that they
should modify their policies.
As the endorsement defIning "actual cash value"
demonstrates, the Facility has done exactly what the
Farber court advised. Presumably dissatisfIed with the
interpretation of "actual cash value" by the court, the
Facility sought to defIne the phrase with greater
precision. Especially when the high-risk associated with
insuring property under the Fair Plan is considered, it is
logical that the Facility would choose to protect itself
with specifIc defInitions of terms or phrases. Finally, it
is an extremely unremarkable choice when one
considers that our Supreme Court invited insurance
companies to do this in Farber.
Id. at 50 (footnote omitted). London stands for the
proposition that, although Fedas and Farber, supra,
remain viable, explicit policy language may avoid their
effects.
12lIJ.Ql1[ 19 From these cases, we conclude that in
partial loss situations, in the absence of clear language to
the contrary, an insurer may not deduct depreciation from
the replacement cost of a policy and that the phrase "actual
cash value" may not be interpreted as including a
depreciation deduction, where such deduction would
thwart the insured's expectation to be made whole. Where
qualifying language is absent and an insured is promised
"actual cash value," the insured is entitled to the cost to
repair or replace the damaged property. Under Fedas and
Farber, supra, our Supreme Court asserts that such
compensation is the only thing that can make an insured
whole. London, supra, holds that a different result can be
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contracted for, but the policy must be clear in that regard.

*1048 i 20 Appellees cite to Callulli v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 315 Pa.Super. 460, 462 A.2d 286 (1983) and
Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 437 Pa.Super. 217, 649
A.2d 941 (1994), for the proposition that "actual cash
value" can only mean the cost of repair or replacement
minus depreciation. We find Appellees' reliance on these
cases to be misplaced. It is true that in Canulli this Court,
inexplicably citing Farber, supra, states that "actual cash
value" includes depreciation. See Canulli. 315 Pa.Super.
at 462, 462 A.2d at 287 (" 'Actual cash value' is the actual
cost of repair or replacement less depreciation."). Putting
aside that this assertion is in direct contravention to the
holding in Farber, we note that the Canulli Court
ultimately quashed the appeal by the insureds in that case
as interlocutory, thus rendering the Court's definition of
actual cash value nonbinding dictum. See London. 703
A.2d at 58 n. 7 (Ford Elliott, J., concurring and
dissenting); see generally TH. v. L.R.M.. 753 A.2d 873,
883 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2000) (dictum is not binding on this
Court or trial courts), affd 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913
(2001).

illl i 21 In Gilderman, this Court likewise stated that
"actual cash value" is "the actual cost of repair or
replacement less depreciation." Gildermall, 437 Pa.Super.
at 221, 649 A.2d at 943. The Court cited only Canulli for
this proposition, and we note that repetition does not
elevate assertions that are otherwise dictum into binding
precedent. See Commonwealth v. Perry. 568 Pa. 499, 529,
798 A.2d 697, 715 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring)
("Dicta is not converted into binding constitutional
precedent through repetition.") Moreover, the Court in
Gilderman was not strictly concerned with the issue of
depreciation; rather, there, the insurer asserted that "actual
cash value" included both depreciation and a flat 20% fee
(allegedly corresponding to contractor overhead).
Gilder/nan. 437 Pa.Super. at 221. 649 A.2d at 943. As the
insurers were not alleging that they were "entitled to full
repair or replacement costs without a depreciation
deduction prior to actual repair or replacement," the
definition of "actual cash value" was not directly relevant.
Id. at 222, 649 A.2d at 943. Thus, we are not persuaded by
Appellees' citation to these cases.

i 22 Turning now to the policies at issue in the instant
case, we note that absent from Fedas, Farber, and
London, however, is the situation present herein which
involves not the denial of liability for replacement cost,
but the timing of that compensation. The trial court noted
that Appellees "have never denied liability or failed to
guarantee reimbursement for the repair or replacement of
the lost personal property." !.:!:ii (Trial Court Opinion,
3118/02, at 11.) Rather, Appellees maintain that they are
only liable for such costs once replacement or repair is
completed.EJ2 Unlike*1049 Fedas, Farber, and London,
wherein the insurers contested liability for such
replacement costs without including depreciation, here,
only the timing of such payments is at issue.B:!1 Thus, the
policy considerations underlying these cases-that an
insured should be made whole, and that in the absence of
language to the contrary, to make an insured whole "actual
cash value" must be interpreted to mean replacement val ue
without depreciation-apply with less force herein as there
is no question that Appellants will be made whole by
Appellees ultimately, if not initially.
FN5. Nor have Appellants sought such coverage.
As the trial court explained:
There are no facts offered that the [Appellants]
actually completed the repairs or replacements
to their respective properties, that they ever
contracted to make the repairs or
replacements, or that they ever even intended
or attempted to repair or replace said property.
Furthermore, this is no allegation that
[Appellants] ever advised the [Appellees] that
they wanted to make appropriate repairs, or
that they submitted documentation to the
[Appellees] showing that any repairs were
made.
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/02, at 7-8.)
FN6. The trial court noted in its Opinion that
Appellees:
have represented to this Court, in their
pleadings as well as at oral argument, that even
if [Appellants] did intend to repair or replace
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their claimed losses, they would not be
required to expend their own funds up front to
effectuate the repairs. To the contrary, once
the [Appellants] undertake to make the
appropriate repairs or replacements, for
example, by contracting to do so, these
insurers would pay the full cost of repairing or
replacing the property.
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/02, at 8 n.
4)(emphasis original.)
FN7. Appellants have not asserted that this
two-step process, in itself, is contrary to
Pennsylvania caselaw or public policy. We,
therefore, offer no opinion in that regard.
<J[ 23 In light of the foregoing, and after a review of the
nine policies at issue, we conclude that, with the exception
of Erie which we discuss further below, Appellants have
failed to allege breach of contract claims against
Appellees. We begin by discussing the policies in the
second group.

LW <J[ 24 These poJicies-issued by Allstate, Metropolitan,
Ace Fire, and Markel-clearly note that compensation will
be paid out on an actual cash value basis which "may"
include a deduction for depreciation (see Allstate Policy,
at 17 (RR 39a); Metropolitan Policy, EndorsementH303,
at 2 (RR 50a); Markel Policy, Endorsement ML-255
(RR 63a», or that compensation will be "less
depreciation" (see Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 57a». Like
the insurer in London, supra, Allstate, Metropolitan, Ace
Fire, and Markel appear to have followed the Supreme
Court's advice in Farbe.r.and have tailored their policies to
clarify the extent of their intended coverage. We find no
merit to Appellants' assertion that the use of "may" makes
the policies ambiguous or misleading.
<J[ 25 Moreover, and more persuasively, when read in
the context of the language of the policies at issue, we
conclude, as did the trial court, that the phrase "actual cash
value" as used in those policies cannot mean replacement
value, as Appellants contend, as such an interpretation
would make the remaining policy language nonsensical. In
each of these policies, there is qualifying language

indicating that "actual cash value" will be the proffered
compensation where the insured does not repair or replace
the damage. (See Allstate Policy, at 17 (RR 39a) ("If you
do not repair or replace the damaged, destroyed or stolen
property, payment will be on an actual cash value basis."
(emphasis added»; Metropolitan Policy, Endorsement
H303, at 2 (RR 50a) ("[W]e will not pay more than the
actual cash value of the damage to the structure until
actual repair or replacement is complete." (emphasis
added»; Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 58a) ("If you then
repair or replace the damaged property and the
[depreciated cost] does not cover your loss, you may make
a claim for the rest of your loss based on the replacement
cost basis." (emphasis added»; Markel Policy,
Endorsement ML-255 (RR 63a) ("If 'you' decide not to
repairor replace under paragraph d) above, the settlement
will be made according to Actual Cash Value." (emphasis
added».) Thus, "actual cash value" cannot also mean
"replacement value." Given that the policies have defined
"actual cash value" to include deductions for depreciation,
we find that the policies unambiguously allow the insurers
*1050 to deduct depreciation until repair or replacement
is made.
<J[ 26 Moreover, with respect to these policies, there is
no concern, as was present in Fedas and Farber, supra,
that the insureds will not be made whole. Here, Appellees
have conceded liability for replacement cost once
Appellants undertake to repair or replace the damage to
their properties. Again, the issue is one of the timing of
compensation, not its extent.

LLli <J[ 27 We come to the same conclusion regarding
the policies in the first group. These policies-issued by
State Farm, Keystone, Ace American, and One Beacon-do
not contain any definition for "actual cash value." When
read in the context of the language of the policies,
however, we note, as we did for the policies in the second
group, that the phrase "actual cash value" as used in those
policies cannot be synonymous with replacement value, as
Appellants contend, as such an interpretation would make
the remaining policy language nonsensical. The language
of these policies is clear that only "actual cash value" will
be proffered "until" or "unless" repair or replacement is
made. (See State Farm Policy, at 11 (RR 35a) ("until
actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 13
841 A.2d 1038,2003 PA Super 502
(Cite as: 841 A.2d 1038)

only the actual cash value at the time of the loss"
(emphasis added)); Keystone Policy, Endorsement HO-3,
at 10-11 (RR 73a-74a) ("we will pay no more than actual
cash value of the damage unless .,. actual repair or
replacement is complete " (emphasis added)); Ace
American Policy, at 7 (RR 54a) (same); One Beacon
Policy, at 8 (RR 66a) ("We will pay no more than the
actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or
replacement is complete." (emphasis added)).)
Cj[ 28 Appellants do not assert that the phrase "actual
cash value" as used in these policies is ambiguous; rather,
they assert that it may not include a deduction for
depreciation. We disagree. The only interpretation of the
phrase "actual cash value" in these policies that makes
sense is one that includes depreciation deductions.
Moreover, this interpretation does not run afoul of Fedas
and Farber, supra, as, under these policies, the insureds
ultimately will be made whole. That is, as in the policies
in the second group, there is no concern here, as was
present in Fedas and Farber, that the inclusion of
depreciation deductions will not fully compensate the
insured.

Il.:!:.l Cj[ 29 We finally address the policy issued by Erie,
which we have quoted at length above. While the policy
clearly defines, in one section, "actual cash value" to mean
that Erie "will deduct for depreciation," (Erie Policy, at 11
(RR 158a)), and while the policy states that Erie "will
pay no more than actual cash value ofthe damage until the
actual repair or replacement is completed" (id.), we find
that the interrelation between the primary policy language
and the endorsement language results in an ambiguity.
First, as Appellants point out, the definition of "actual
cash value" is prefaced with language indicating that it
applies only to "the following types of losses" which
specifically exclude dwelling damage as alleged herein.
(Id.) Second, while later language in the "LOSS
SETTLEMENT" section indicates that Erie "will pay no
more than actual cash value of the damage until the actual
repair or replacement is completed" (id.), it is unclear
whether this phrase applies to dwelling damage once the
endorsement language is overlaid. Specifically, the
endorsement, which is entitled "DWELLING
REPLACEMENT COST GUARANTEE
ENDORSEMENT," specifically indicates that dwelling

coverage "will be settled on a replacement cost basis,
without deduction for depreciation." (Erie Policy Dwelling
*1051 Replacement Cost Guarantee Endorsement HP-BK
(RR 159a).)
Cj[ 30 While it is reasonable to infer, as Appellees
argue, that regardless of the endorsement, the provision in
the main policy which indicates that only actual cash value
will be offered until repair or replacement is complete
remains, we conclude it is equally reasonable for a policy
holder to interpret the policy, as Appellants suggest, to
mean that replacement cost is to be paid in the first
instance without depreciation deductions. As there are two
reasonable interpretations of the policy language, we must
apply the interpretation favoring the insureds. See
Madison, 557 Pa. at 606, 735 A.2d at 106. At any rate,
this ambiguity convinces us that it was error for the trial
court to dismiss the breach of contract claim against Erie
at this early preliminary objection stage of the litigation.
See 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 437
Pa.Super. at 654,650 A.2d at 1096 (doubts as to the legal
sufficiency of the complaint should be resolved in favor of
overruling the demurrer).
Cj[ 31 For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
the trial court properly dismissed the breach of contract
claims against each of the Appellees, except for Erie, and
accordingly affirm the order as to those Appellees. For the
same reasons, we conclude the trial court· properly
dismissed Appellants' related claims under the UTPCPL,
again, except as against Erie, and accordingly afftrm the
order as to those Appellees. We conclude, however, that
the trial court erred in dismissing the breach of contract
claim against Erie, and reverse the order below in that
regard. Given that the trial court dismissed the UTPCPL
claim against Erie based on an erroneous conclusion that
the underlying breach of contract claims were meritless,
we remand for the trial court to reconsider the UTPCPL
claim against Erie in light of this opinion. Appellants have
not challenged the dismissal of their bad faith claims
against Appellees, and thus we do not disturb the trial
court's determination in that respect.
Cj[ 32 Order AFFIRMED as to Appellees State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company, Allstate Insurance Company,
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company,
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Ace American Insurance Company, Ace Fire Underwriters
Insurance Company, Markel American Insurance
Company, One Beacon Insurance, and Keystone Insurance
Company. Order REVERSED as to Appellee Erie
Insurance Company. Case REMANDED for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction
RELINQUISHED.
<][ 33 GRACI, J. files a Concurring and Dissenting

Statement.
GRACI, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
<][ 1 In typical fashion, the Opinion of the majority
provides a thorough and compelling analysis of the
complicated factual and legal issues presented in this case.
I join its analysis and expression of the law in its entirety
and differ from my esteemed colleagues only in the
application of the law to the case against Erie.
<][ 2 The learned majority appropriately cites Madison
Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.. 557 Pa. 595, 735
A.2d 100, 106 (1999), for the proposition that a court
"must find that 'contractual terms are ambiguous if they
are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation
when applied to a particular set offacts.' " Opinion, at
lO42 (emphasis added). In my view, under the particular
set of facts present in this case, the contractual terms
which the majority finds ambiguous are not subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation. Like the language
in the *1052 other policies which the majority concludes
yields a different result, the language of the Erie policy,
under the particular facts present here, requires actual
replacement before replacement value is due. The
language in the Erie policy is the functional equivalent of
that found sufficient in the other policies. Accordingly, in
my view, the result should be the same. I WOUld, therefore,
affirm the order of the trial court in its entirety.
Pa.Super.,2003.
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